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Introduction 
 
1. Background and Research Questions  
In Japan, overseas troop dispatches to international military operations, 
including UN PKOs and other operations outside of UN auspices, have been a 
controversial issue due to the firmly entrenched domestic norms opposed to the use of 
force in settling international disputes.1 As explained by many constructivist scholars, 
such normative constraints include the famous Article 9 of the Japanese post-war 
constitution that prohibits “the use of force as means of settling international disputes” 
and the maintenance of “war potential” by Japan2 and the 1954 Upper House Resolution 
that banned the overseas dispatch of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (hereafter SDF).3 In 
addition to the legal constraints, Japanese society has been, in general, opposed to the 
SDF’s involvement in any kind of military operation that exceeds the defense of Japan 
from direct military attack.4 Faced with these domestic restrictions the Japanese policy-
making elite had not contributed troops to participate in international military operations 
for decades after the end of the Second World War.5  
                                                   
1 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies,” 
International Security 17, no.4 (Spring 1993): 98.  
2 Constitution of Japan, Chapter II Renunciation of War, Article 9. The English translation of the 
Constitution is available online at 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html accessed March 14, 
2015. 
3 Kazumi Kenmochi, PKO Hahei Bunseki to Shiryō (Tokyo: Rokufu Shuppan, 1992), 234.  
4 Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011): 30-31.  
5 There had been exceptions to that policy, however. The SDF personnel had been sent overseas for 
civilian duties. For details see Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary 
Japan (New York: Routledge, 1996), 79. Also, during the Korean War minesweepers were secretly 
dispatched. For details about Japan’s involvement in the Korean War see Tomohiko Satake “Chapter 5: 
Korean Peninsula Division/Unification: From the Security Perspective of Japan,” in Korean Peninsula 
Division/Unification: From the International Perspective, ed. Kyuryoon Kim and Jae-Jeok Park (Seoul: 
Korean Institute for National Unification, 2012), 121.  
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However, since the end of the Persian Gulf War (1990-91), overseas troop 
dispatches to international military operations have increased, and the SDF’s roles were 
expanded along with them. Three major turning points in Japan’s policy on overseas troop 
dispatches can be identified. The first turning point was the enactment of the Law 
Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other 
Operations (hereafter the UN PKO Law) in June 1992 which authorized the SDF to 
engage in UN PKOs, humanitarian missions and election monitoring with a number of 
restrictions. 6  Based on this law, between 1990 and 2000, the SDF members were 
dispatched to UN PKOs in Angola, Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), El 
Salvador, Golan Heights (UNDOF), Zaire and Tanzania (as part of the mission in Rwanda, 
UNAMIR).7  
In 2000s the expansion of the SDF’s overseas military roles continued both 
within and outside of the UN framework. The largest SDF unit was dispatched to a UN 
peacekeeping mission in East Timor in March 2002. More importantly, a second turning 
point occurred during the Koizumi administration with the enactment of two special 
measures laws that authorized the SDF’s support to United States-led military campaigns 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. During the war in Afghanistan, the SDF was authorized to 
provide logistical support in the Indian Ocean to the US-led military coalition. During the 
war in Iraq, the SDF provided reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in the combat 
                                                   
6 Katsumi Ishizuka, “Japan’s New Role in Peace-Building Missions,” East Asia 23, no.3 (2006), 6. These 
restrictions are called the “Five Conditions” that need to be met before any SDF dispatch is made in the 
context of a UN PKO. These conditions include (1) a ceasefire agreement between the conflicting parties 
(2) the consent of the conflicting parties to the UN PKO mission and Japan’s participation in that mission. 
(3) Impartiality of the mission (4) if the above conditions cease to be met, the Government of Japan can 
withdraw its forces (5) restrictions on the use of weapons.  
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Chapter II. Sectoral Analysis of the International Situation and 
Japan’s Foreign Policy,” in Diplomatic Bluebook 2000, accessed March 15, 2015, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/II-1-b.html#4; Ishizuka, “Japan’s New Role in Peace-
Building Missions,” 7. 
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zone.  
 In the years after Koizumi, there have been proposals from within the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to establish a permanent law legalizing troop dispatches 
for international military operations outside the UN framework. Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe, during his first term (2006-2007) had sought to create such a permanent law. Even 
though Abe’s early attempts failed, in 2007 the lesser goal of participating in UN-led 
PKOs was incorporated into the SDF Law8 as one of the primary duties of the SDF 
alongside the defense of Japanese territory and its environs.9 As of June 2014, Japan has 
contributed 10,600 personnel including SDF and police to UN PKO missions in 16 
countries10  
More recently, the third-term Abe Cabinet succeeded in further expanding 
the SDF’s overseas roles with the enactment of an international peace assistance law 
(kokusai heiwa shien hō) on September 19, 2015. The law allows the SDF to provide 
logistical support to allies in international military operations, thereby institutionalizing 
what was a temporary initiative during the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Abe Cabinet 
changed the long-standing interpretation of the Constitution and acknowledged Japan’s 
right to collective self-defense in a limited way.  
With this in mind, three critical junctures of change in Japan’s policy on 
overseas troop dispatches to international military operations can be identified. First, the 
enactment of the UN PKO Law which enabled the overseas troop dispatches to UN-led 
                                                   
8 Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Chapter 2: Initiatives to Further Stabilize the International Security 
Environment,” in Defense of Japan 2013, accessed October 27, 2014. 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2013.html, 248. 
9 Article 3 of the Japanese Self Defense Forces Law states the main duties of the SDF Forces. The 
Japanese version of the Law is available online at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO165.html  
10 For details of each missions see Japan’s Cabinet Office, Secretariat of the International Peace 
Cooperation Headquarters, Paths to Peace: History of Japan’s International Peace Cooperation, accessed 
January 15, 2015, http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_j/info/other/pdf/michi_e2014/michi2014-e.pdf  
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peacekeeping operations (1992). Second, the enactment of the two Special Measures 
Laws which authorized troop dispatches in support of the United States-led “war on terror” 
in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Third, the creation of the International Peace 
Support Law (2015) which authorized the dispatch of the SDF in support of an ally under 
attack.  
The present study limits the scope of analysis to two specific turning points: 
the enactment of the UN PKO Law, and the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law that allowed troop deployments in support of the war in Afghanistan.  In 
each case, this research attempts to explain how the laws were enacted in the face of 
domestic opposition, and how the government managed to convince the opposition parties 
to vote in favor of the laws. More specific research questions are in the following way. 
 
Research Question 1: During the Persian Gulf Crisis and the 
ensuing war, the Kaifu Cabinet was unable to deploy the SDF to 
provide logistical support to the US-led multinational military 
coalition, as such an act was regarded as unconstitutional by the 
government and the opposition parties. After the end of the war, a 
UN PKO law was established despite initial domestic opposition. 
How did the government succeeded in convincing the opposition 
parties to approve the law? Did the opposition parties change their 
normative beliefs as a result of persuasion or material benefits?  
 
Research Question 2: How was the Koizumi Cabinet able to deploy 
the SDF for logistical support during the “war on terror” in 
Afghanistan, given that such a response was regarded 
unconstitutional by the Kaifu and Miyazawa Cabinets a decade 
earlier? Moreover, how was it possible for the subsequent LDP-led 
coalition governments to extend the law a number of times despite 
domestic opposition?   
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Before moving on to the main argument, it is important to explain the 
shortcomings in the existing body of work and outline the contribution of this research 
 
2. Review of Previous Literature and Contribution of the Study   
The establishment of a US-led military coalition11 to oust the invading Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait at the beginning of 1990s and the mission’s success have generated 
interest among scholars of international relations and military alliances. They 
problematized the issue of “burden-sharing.” Researchers have become interested in why 
certain states contributed more than others, and why the nature of their contribution varied. 
Why do some states contribute troops to combat while others engage in humanitarian and 
civilian missions? Do domestic factors such as forms of government12, public opinion, 
bureaucratic politics13, election cycles14 or legal norms on the use of force have more 
explanatory power than system-level factors such as alliance dependence15 , level of 
threat16, or collective legitimization (the presence of a UN Security Council Resolution)17. 
The role of these variables were examined in both small-n and large-n case studies. 
Research on the determinants of participation in military coalitions deals with these 
questions.  
                                                   
11 Coalitions are “short-term, ad-hoc, and purpose-oriented, international security cooperation” with 
varying purposes depending on the mission including military intervention and peacekeeping. Atsushi 
Tago, “Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and 
legitimacy,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7, no.2 (2007): 3. 
12 Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of 
National Restrictions upon Nato’s Mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no.1 
(2012): 71. 
13Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, “Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” 
International Organization 48, no.1 (1994): 39-75.  
14 Atsuhi Tago, “When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from 
the ‘Coalition of the Willing’,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no.2 (2009): 219-234. 
15 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, “Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” 
International Organization 48, no.1 (1994): 39-75. 
16 Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats” : 67-84.  
17 Atsushi Tago, “Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: 179-202. 
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Research on participation in military coalitions takes into account cross-
country variation where Japan is regarded as an outlier case as a result of its limited role 
in the “global war on terror” and fight against the Islamic State. Understanding Japan’s 
restrained contribution to international security has interested many scholars. The puzzle 
has been, why Japan not provided the level of contribution to international security that 
befits its status as a major economic power and US-ally in East Asia.  
In 2001, the US called for another military “coalition of the willing”18 to 
eradicate the Al-Qaida stronghold and Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Yet, once again, 
Japan’s contribution was considered limited compared to other countries. As explained 
earlier, the role of the Japanese armed forces have been expanded; however, compared to 
other US allies Japan is lagging behind. Japan has definitely not yet become a “Britain of 
East Asia,” instead Japan has carved out for itself the role of a “peacebuilder” or a 
“civilian contributor.” Nevertheless, even if Japanese armed forces have not participated 
in combat roles still, this marked a major turning point in that for the first time they 
provided logistical support to the US-led forces during an on-going conflict. 
Understanding such a change necessitates an in-depth single-case study of the evolution 
of Japan’s policy on overseas troop deployments.  
 Constructivist scholars have argued that anti-militarism/pacifism in Japan became 
institutionalized as a state identity after the end of the Second World War and shaped the 
external and internal security policies of the state.19 However, despite firmly entrenched 
                                                   
18 Vucetic defines a US-led coalition of the willing as follows “a military operation in which at least one 
other state joins the US effort but where the US provides the largest portion of the coalition’s forces 
and/or the US commands the forces in the theatre of operations….From a much larger sample of US 
military interventions abroad in the post-World War period, 17 cases qualify as a US-led coalition of the 
willing.” Afghanistan is included in those cases. Srdjan Vucetic, “Bound to Follow? The Anglosphere and 
US-led coalitions of the willing, 1950-2001,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no1. 
(2010): 33. 
19 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan 
(Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1996); Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum, 1993; Hook, 
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institutions, the actual policies have changed over time. The Constructivist scholars have 
downplayed the scale of these changes by emphasizing their non-military and limited 
nature. For example, Oros argues that anti-militarist state identity continues to shape 
Japan’s security policy.20 This paper challenges their view and points out that in the 
policy making processes domestic actors’ adherence to norms fluctuate when material 
interests necessitate.  
Other scholars have examined the role of economic interests, public opinion, 
external pressures (both U.S. and Asian), “alliance consolidation” vis-à-vis the 
deteriorating regional security environment, and Koizumi’s leadership skills. While all of 
these works have provided useful insight, none of them explored the changing stances of 
the opposition parties in Japan in favor of a more active role for the armed forces in 
support of international military operations. Here, contribution of other scholars is briefly 
reviewed before moving onto the main argument.  
Heginbotham and Samuels, argued that Japan’s “limited” support for U.S.-
led military operations in the Middle East was due to the Japanese political elite’s concern 
over jeopardizing oil imports from the region. They explain that during the war in 
Afghanistan, Japan did not engage in military combat in order to maintain amicable 
relations with oil exporting countries in the region.21 Not only has Japan diversified its 
energy sources since the first oil shock in 1973, in the case of the war in Afghanistan, 
major oil exporting countries to Japan such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have explicitly or 
implicitly supported US intervention and there was no pressure on oil-importing countries 
                                                   
Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, 1998. 
20 Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) 
21 Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 
114-115.  
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not to cooperate with the coalition forces. 
Midford pointed out the influence of public opinion in constraining the 
political elite’s move to assertive policies. He explains “…public opinion has molded and 
constrained the overseas deployment plans of hawkish elites.”22 There are number of 
problems with Midford’s argument. First of all, it is very difficult to prove whether the 
opposition parties or factions within the LDP opposed the more hawkish elite’s initiatives 
based on public opinion or on their own beliefs which may be similar to public opinion. 
Second, it is not clear that the political elite in Japan are responsive to public 
opinion on foreign policy issues. In the case of the extensions of the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law, public opinion was largely against it, nevertheless the government 
passed the extension bills. More recently, when the Abe Cabinet proposed the security 
related laws in September 2015, there was very strong opposition from the public but 
again, the government passed the security bills. According to a public opinion poll 
conducted by the Asahi Shimbun 51 percent of the respondents were against the ten 
security related laws passed by the Abe Cabinet. 23  Not all politicians in Japan are 
sensitive to public opinion.  
External pressures exerted by either United States 24  (U.S. pressure) or 
Japan’s neighbors in East Asia are put forward as factors that enabled Japan to make a 
greater contribution to both U.N. peacekeeping operations and U.S.-led military 
operations. As Midford noted, the Koizumi Cabinet faced less U.S. pressure after the 
                                                   
22 Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011): 3. 
23 “Asahi Poll: 51% oppose security laws, 74% criticize Cabinet’s explanation to public,” Asahi Shimbun, 
September 21, 2015. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201509210023 
24 Aurelia George, “Japan’s Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or 
Predictable Response?” Asian Survey 33, no.6. (1993): 560. 
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September 11 incidents, compared to the previous Japanese government experienced 
during the Persian Gulf War. Midford argued that a “demonstration effect” created by 
SDF’s non-combat roles in UN peacekeeping operation throughout the 1990s led to 
declining pressure from Japan’s Asian neighbors, which has eliminated the barriers for 
dispatching the SDF.25  
Scholars such as Hughes and Calder, have attributed the SDF’s cooperation 
with U.S. forces, in the form of both bilateral defense cooperation and greater contribution 
to U.S.-led military campaign in the Middle East, as a response to the changing balance 
of power in East Asia. They explain at a time of rising military and economic capabilities 
in China and revelations about North Korea’s nuclear capability, Japan has been impelled 
to strengthen its alliance with the United States and support U.S.-led initiatives. Thus, 
according to Calder and Hughes, the driving force behind Japan’s unanticipated support 
to the U.S.-led war on terror was “alliance consolidation”26 in the face of growing threat 
perceptions vis-à-vis China and North Korea.27  
Finally, Shinoda’s research shows how the administrative reforms made in 
1997-98 during the Hashimoto Cabinet (1996-98) expanded the powers of the executive 
branch vis-à-vis MOFA in initiating foreign policy related bills, which in turn enabled the 
Koizumi Cabinet to pass security-related bills (including the bills to dispatch the SDF to 
the Indian Ocean and Iraq) more speedily compared to the previously enacted UN PKO 
Law.28 According to Shinoda, Prime Minister Koizumi took advantage of the reforms 
                                                   
25 Paul Midford, “Japan’s Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea,” Asian Survey 43, 
no.2 (March/April 2003): 330.  
26 Kent E. Calder, Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009), 140 and 144.  
27 A similar view to Calder’s is expressed in Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a ‘Normal’ 
Military Power, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 46.  
28 Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs 
(Seattle: University of Washington, 2007), 133. 
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and crafted the “Kantei diplomacy” a mechanism of policy coordination both within the 
LDP and the ruling coalition. Even though Shinoda’s work demonstrates how the 
decision-making process had become more efficient as a result of institutional changes, 
it does not account for how the LDP managed to convince the opposition parties to vote 
in favor of the law.  
The literature referred above has touched on a number of factors which has 
either constrained or expanded Japan’s contribution to international security. This study 
deals with the issue of how it was possible for the ruling LDP to acquire approval of the 
opposition parties whose votes were essential to the passage of relevant laws?  
 
3. Analytical Framework, Method and Data 
This study tests the plausibility of two competing hypotheses about the 
mechanisms that change a political party’s foreign policy choices. Constructivist theory 
suggests that domestic actors’ normative beliefs change as a result of persuasion. They 
are convinced in the goodness or rightness of a particular policy or idea. This convinces 
them to replace their previously held opinions with new ones.  
An alternative mechanism is suggested by rational choice theorists who 
believe that normative beliefs do not have an independent influence over behavior. Actors 
might act in accordance with newly learned norms or ideas only if they receive a material 
benefit in return for acting in accordance with them. The nature of material incentives 
changes depending on the status of the domestic actors. For example, a small political 
party can seek to enhance its political power by obtaining a role in the cabinet or ministry 
in a policy area important to that party. This would be a strong incentive for the party to 
compromise its policy views in other areas. The value of the material incentive is 
13 
 
important in the sense that accepting the offered incentive should be less costly than 
making adjustments in a foreign policy issues.  
In order to test the plausibility of the competing hypotheses, the method of 
process tracing is used. This is an appropriate model to verify the absence or presence of 
a causal mechanism in a single case. Intra-party relations and the government’s strategy 
to convince opposition parties in three distinct time periods are investigated. The first 
time period covers the enactment of the UN PKO Law (1991-92) which is explained in 
the first chapter. The second time period, is the enactment and extensions of the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001-06). The final period covers the time between the 
2007 Upper House election which produced the divided legislature to the 2009 general 
election which brought the DPJ-led coalition government in power.   
In each time period, there was a high degree of internal division on state identity 
(i.e. Japan’s role in international society) and the utility of the armed forces as an 
instrument of foreign policy. However, the cases differed in the government’s ability to 
convince the opposition and value of the material incentives offered to the opposition 
parties. These differences produced different policy outcomes.  
In the first time period, the government managed to persuade two opposition 
parties (Komeito and DSP) by incorporating their demands into the draft bill and through 
material incentives. Furthermore, when the talks on the passage of the UN PKO law 
reached at a stalemate, the Miyazawa Cabinet threatened to call simultaneous elections 
which would be critical for the smaller parties’ political survival. In this way, the 
government manage succeeded in convincing the two smaller parties to vote in favor of 
the bill.  
In the second time period, up until the 2007 Upper House election the LDP-led 
14 
 
cabinets were in coalition with Komeito. In the coalition formation process, they had 
already agreed on terms of cooperation. Komeito approved the idea of the SDF engaging 
in logistical support mission for a US-led coalition if the coalition’s role was based on a 
UN resolution. In exchange Komeito was given the Ministry of Labor and Welfare as part 
of the coalition agreement. During the enactment and the extensions of the Anti-Terrorism 
Law, the main opposition party DPJ voted against the bills; however, as the ruling 
coalition held a majority in both houses up until the 2007 Upper House election, the bills 
were passed. 
The third time period starts with the 2007 Upper House election which resulted 
in a victory for the DPJ with a divided legislature. The Lower House was controlled by 
the ruling coalition parties but the Upper House by the opposition. The DPJ’s victory was 
also the predictor that the party had a good chances of winning the upcoming Lower 
House election to displace the LDP. Even if the ruling parties had the two thirds majority 
in the Lower House by which they could override an Upper House rejection, they initially 
sought to negotiate with the DPJ.  
The then Prime Minister Fukuda made an offer to then head of both the DPJ 
and the largest faction within the party, Ichiro Ozawa, to join the LDP in return for his 
support to extension bills. However, this was rejected by Ozawa as the possibility of 
winning the next Lower House election was high for DPJ. Thus, in this case, the material 
incentives provided by the government were not sufficient to persuade the opposition 
became the party that had the opportunity to come into power in the upcoming election. 
Eventually the law expired, and the SDF’s logistical support mission was briefly 
suspended. The Fukuda Cabinet proposed a new bill with similar content and it passed 
the Diet with a second vote in the Lower House, following a rejection in the Upper House. 
15 
 
In 2010, when the DPJ-led coalition government was established, the first task was to 
terminate the SDF’s logistical support mission.  
The results of this analysis demonstrates that normative persuasion alone is 
insufficient to produce change in political parties’ foreign policy preferences and material 
incentives do matter.  
 
4. Structure of the Dissertation  
This dissertation is organized in the following way. Chapter 1 explains the 
analytical framework, the methods and the data used in the research in detail. Here, two 
competing approaches on the changes in domestic actors’ (political parties, in particular) 
views on foreign policy issues are discussed. These two approaches are constructivist and 
rational choice. Chapter 2 focuses on political process behind the enactment of the UN 
PKO Law (1990-1992). Chapter 3 focuses on the changes in the domestic distribution of 
power and ideational changes in the period from the 1993 to 2001. Chapter 4 deals with 
the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law which authorized support for 
the US–led war on terror in Afghanistan (2001-2010). The final section is the conclusion.   
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Chapter 1  
Dynamics of Change in Domestic Actors’ Foreign Policy Preferences: Normative 
Persuasion or Material Incentives? 
 
1. Introduction 
As previously stated in the introductory chapter, the reason for undertaking 
this study is the limitations in the existing constructivist explanations of Japanese foreign 
and security policy. Specifically, this study tries to explain how it was possible for 
“pacifist” Japan to contribute troops to the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan. A decade 
before that the war started, contributing troops for logistical support to UN- sanctioned 
international military operations had been considered as a form of support for the use of 
force, and therefore deemed “unconstitutional” by the then Japanese government (Kaifu 
and Miyazawa Cabinets). So, how did it become possible for the Koizumi Cabinet to send 
troops for logistical support to the US-led military coalition during the war in 
Afghanistan?  
Constructivist scholars have argued that “pacifist norms” have constrained 
Japan’s security policy and overseas troop contributions to international peacekeeping 
operations. However, since the end of the Cold War, and especially in the context of the 
US-led “war on terror” in the Middle East, the Japanese armed forces’ external roles have 
been expanded and the constructivist scholars have failed to provide a persuasive 
explanation of this policy change. This study seeks to understand how it was possible for 
successive LDP- led governments to expand the roles of the SDF in international military 
operations despite large-scale domestic opposition. What kind of strategies did the 
government use to acquire the approval of the opposing actors on the passage of the laws 
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governing troop dispatches and their duties?  
At the theoretical level, the study aims to determine the mechanisms a ruling 
party uses to change the position of opposing actors’ when their approval is indispensable. 
Is such change induced by “normative persuasion” or “material incentives”? Another 
question addressed here is: do norms have any independent influence over policy, in other 
words, are they divorced from political interests?   
The first section of this chapter re-visits the earlier constructivist works on 
Japan’s security policy and explains their limitations. The second section then discusses 
the sources of change in actors’ preferences in the constructivist literature. The third 
section looks at the alternative view, namely the rationalist explanations for change in 
preferences. The final section explains the methods and data used and the study’s 
limitations.  
 
2. Limitations of the Extant Constructivist Analysis of Japan’s Security 
Policy 
Constructivist analysis of Japan’s security policy has been considered 
persuasive by many; however, the main argument of constructivists that “pacifist norms” 
continue to shape Japan’s security policy seems to no longer capture the reality of policy 
change. In particular, constructivist literature has ignored the causes of change in the 
stance of one of the most ardent supporters of pacifism in Japan, the Komeito. This study 
does not focus on Komeito’s stance. Instead it analyzes the reasons behind the fluctuating 
views of the opposition parties including Komeito, throughout the policy-making process. 
Furthermore, it addresses what mechanisms the government used to induce such change. 
Nonetheless, some insight into Komeito’s motives can be revealed. However, a future 
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study to examine the factors underlying the evolution of the party’s security policy in 
detail would be illuminating as the party has been the key pacifist actor in Japan.   
Constructivist scholars Katzenstein and Berger, argue that 
pacifist/antimilitarist norms have constrained Japan’s security policy. Katzenstein argued 
that both the institutionalized legal norms (Article 9) and social norms (public opinion) 
have generated a security policy which eschewed the use of force. Institutionalized in the 
political system and society in various ways, pacifist norms have induced limited defense 
spending, a stance opposed to overseas troop deployments for combat role and the use of 
military technology in civilian areas, and the refusal to acquire nuclear weapons.29 He 
also argued that in post-war Japan, a security policy that focused on economic and social 
aspects rather than the military has evolved. Economic growth and technological 
innovation and “reliance on peaceful means” such as economic aid have been the defining 
features of Japan’s security policy. 30  Berger made a similar argument to that of 
Katzenstein by arguing that Germany and Japan’s unique experiences with militarism, 
aggressive war and their ensuing defeat generated the development of unique “cultures 
of anti-militarism.”31  
Both Katzenstein and Berger’s analyses is until the mid-1990s, and they did 
not take into account the following period. Therefore, the validity of their claims need to 
be investigated. Singh believed that the fact that the constructivist analysis of Japan’s 
security policy needs an “update.” He argued that the expansion of the overseas roles of 
                                                   
29 Peter, J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996): 121-130. 
30 Ibid, 2-3 and 10. 
31 Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” in The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996): 317-245. 
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the SDF can be attributed to a shift in the identity of the state from a “peace state” to an 
“international state”. Singh observes that under the “peace-state identity”, the SDF’s main 
mandate was confined to self-defense and domestic disaster relief. However, with the 
adoption of the international state identity, its mandate was expanded to contribute to 
regional and international security. Consequently, the SDF has increasingly participated 
in peacekeeping, humanitarian and overseas disaster relief operations.32 
Research using constructivist frame of analysis by Oros does not explain 
these changes either. He defined Japan’s anti-militarist state identity as having three core 
features:  
I. No traditional armed forces involved in domestic policy-
making,  
II. No use of force by Japan to resolve international disputes, 
except in self-defense and  
III. No Japanese participation in foreign wars.33  
 
Even though Oros conceded that the SDF’s participation in the “war on terror” 
has “violated” the third feature of its security identity, he still argued that antimilitarist 
norms limited the SDF’s roles in the sense that the SDF did not participate in actual 
combat.34 Even though the SDF did not participate in actual combat, its roles have been 
expanded to include logistical support to military operations, an act considered 
unconstitutional by the government and the opposition a decade ago.  
This means, an important question remains unanswered. How did the LDP-
led government manage to obtain the approval of opposing actors whose votes were 
                                                   
32 Bhubhindar Singh, Japan’s Security Identity: Form a Peace State to an international state, (New York: 
Routledge, 2013): 96-115. 
33 Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 45. 
34 Ibid, 182. 
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essential to enact the laws on troop dispatches and their duties on the ground? 
Furthermore, why do opposition parties normative beliefs fluctuate? This research 
attempts to fill this gap in our understanding of Japanese security policy.  
3. Constructivism and Change in Domestic Actors’ Foreign Policy 
Preferences: Norms, Identity and Persuasion  
From the constructivist perspective, the political world is essentially made 
up of ideas. Ideational structures such as norms or scientific knowledge are the main 
sources of political practices and their changes. Norm is the core concept in constructivist 
analysis. A norm can be defined as a standard of appropriate behavior or common 
expectations of how to behave. They are prescriptive and make behavioral claims.  
The behavioral implication is that actors act in accordance with a given norm 
and policy preferences are shaped by that norm. In such a case, the actors adopt a “logic 
of appropriateness.” This logic suggests that actors are motivated to act in accordance 
with rules and norms35 because they consider such action appropriate, socially acceptable 
or morally right and not because they derive some material benefit from so doing. This is 
in contrast to the “logic of consequences”. Actors behaving in accordance with the logic 
of consequences are interested in utility maximization through choosing the best option 
with the highest utility and the lowest cost. They choose a course of action because they 
derive some benefit from so doing. Sikkink and Finnemore explain this difference in the 
following way:  
 
The behavioral logic underlying the economistic and rational 
choice approaches to norm analysis is utility maximization. Actors 
                                                   
35 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” 
International Organization 52, no.4 (Autumn 1998): 951-952. 
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construct and conform to norms because norms help them get what 
they want. An alternative approach to understanding norm 
conformance is what March and Olsen call the “logic of 
appropriateness,” in which actors internalize roles and rules as 
scripts to which they conform, not for instrumental reasons— to get 
what they want— but because they understand the behavior to be 
good, desirable, and appropriate. Habit, duty, sense of obligation 
and responsibility as well as principled belief may all be powerful 
motivators for people and underpin significant episodes of world 
politics.36 
 
Norms can have external or internal sources in relation to the state. Externally, 
they can be postulated and promoted by, for example, international organizations and 
international non-governmental organizations which may change individual states’ 
policies when they reach the status of salient international standards of acceptable 
behavior. Norms can also be created by actors (or agents in constructivist parlance) within 
a state and can shape the state’s external (or foreign) policies. Finally, this external- 
internal divide may not always be useful in understanding the life cycle of the norm and 
how it shapes policy, since “mutual constitution” is the essential mechanism by which 
agents and international structures interact. Agents constitute international structures 
(international standards of acceptable behavior) and structures constitute agents’ 
identities and practices.37 
One example of a domestic norm is state identity. Identity can be defined as 
“the agent’s understanding of self, its place in the social world, and its relationship with 
                                                   
36 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics an Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no.4 (Autumn 1998): 912.  
37 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International 
Organization 41, no.3 (Summer, 1987): 339.  
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others.”38 A state identity is a collectively held view by a state’s foreign policy makers 
about what their state represents and what kind of a role the state should fulfill in the 
international context.39 State identity is not an individual’s peculiar views on the role of 
the state but is based on “intersubjective understandings” shared by a group of people40 
which are irreducible to the individual level.41 
How does identity shape foreign policy? One group of constructivist scholars 
suggest that identities both generate and shape ideas on national interests which in turn 
determines foreign policy. These scholars argue that identities are usually contextual and 
defined in relation to other states through social interaction, which in return shape 
interests. For example, a U.S.-ally state identity may generate an interest in supporting 
United States-led initiatives. Here the assumption is that actors do not know what they 
want prior to social interaction. Through social interaction they define others and 
themselves and come to know what they want. As Jepperson et al explain:  
 
Many national security interests depend on a particular construction 
of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others. Actors 
often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what 
                                                   
38 Trine Flockhart, “Constructivism and Foreign Policy,” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, ed. 
Steve Smith and others, 78-109. (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2012), 85. 
39 Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration,” European Journal of International 
Relations 5, no.3 (1999): 260; Yong Wook Lee, “Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund: An identity-
Intention Approach,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 2 (2006): 343; Kuniko Ashizawa, “When 
Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Institution Building, and Japanese Foreign Policy,” 
International Studies Review 10, no.3 (2008): 573 and 575. 
40 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 
23, no.1 (Summer 1998): 174. Adler defines intersubjective knowledge or inter-subjectivity as follows: 
“Collective knowledge [that] persists beyond the lives of the individual social actors, embedded in social 
routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and 
workings.” In Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European 
Journal of International Relations 3, no.3 (1997): 322. 
41 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4, no.1. (2001): 
391. 
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they are representing— “who they are”— which in turn depends on 
their social relationships.”42  
 
Also, Hopf explains the relationship between identity and interest conceptions:  
 
Given that interests are the product of identity, that is, having the 
identity of a “great power” implies a particular set of interests 
different from those implied by the identity of a “European Union 
member,” and that identities are multiple, constructivist logic 
precludes acceptance of pregiven interests.43 
 
Moreover, constructivists argue that identities can be multiple and fluid. 
There can be various views on identity in a given domestic context. The contested nature 
of identity is one of its essential features. Even if identities are based on shared 
understandings among a group of people, in a given society there are usually diverse and 
contrasting views on state identity. 44  For example, what Japan represents in the 
international context and the roles it should play can be envisioned differently by different 
groups of people. Identities can be contested both horizontally among the political elite 
and vertically between the political elite and the wider society.45  
The degree of contestation can have a significant impact over policy-making 
especially when there is a wide gap between the identity conceptions of the political elite 
                                                   
42 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in 
National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. 
Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 60.  
43 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 
23, no.1 (Summer 1998): 176. 
44 Michael N. Barnett, “The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable,” in 
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael N. Barnett (Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 62. 
45 Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory 
in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (2012): 5-24. 
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and the public as well as within the political elite. When a certain conception of state 
identity reaches a dominant status within a society, the foreign policy outcomes should 
be in line with the policy preferences specified by that identity 46  However, when 
identities are contested to a high degree, the foreign policy making process becomes a 
competition among actors who want to impose their own views.47  
Constructivist scholars have also pointed out that identities are subject to 
change over time. They are neither fixed nor static. The conditions that ignite major 
change can be external shock such as a military invasion or a defeat in war,48 or “critical 
situations” which generate anxiety caused by “challenges to self-identity”49 or at times 
when the existing conception of identity is no longer relevant under new conditions.50 
Singh mentions that identity changes are most common in structural transformation and 
in crisis situations.51 A number of scholars view the criticism that Japan endured in the 
aftermath of the Persian Gulf Crisis as a challenge to Japan’s peace state identity.52 
An alternative to the “identity constitutes interests” mechanism one is where 
actors’ material interests come first and identities are used as a tool to serve certain 
political interests. As Saidemann points out “politicians seek to justify their policies with 
                                                   
46 Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 9. 
47 Michael N. Barnett, “The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable,” in 
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael N. Barnett (Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 62; Rawi Abdelal et al. “Identity as a Variable,” in Measuring Identity: A Guide 
For Social Scientists, ed. Rawi Abdelal et al., 1-13. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 27. 
48 Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” in The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 318. 
49 Brent J. Steele, “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the 
American Civil War,” Review of International Studies 31, no.3 (July 2005): 526. 
50 Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, “In search of a theory of national identity”, in China’s Quest for 
National Identity (eds.) Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993):6-7 
51 Bhubhindar Singh, Japan’s Security Identity: From a peace state to an international state (London: 
Routledge, 2013): 44. 
52 Lindsay Black, “Debating Japan’s intervention to tackle piracy in the Gulf of Aden: beyond 
mainstream paradigms,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 12, no.2 (2012): 266 
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reference to a particular identity even if more material interests drive these policies.”53 
He further adds “by invoking identity the politician can minimize opposition or even 
mobilize support from those who do not benefit from the policy change.”54 This second 
point is very important in that it shows how actors instrumentally use norms to serve their 
own interests. In this scenario, the actor adopts a logic of consequences and a given 
identity is invoked only when it serves actors’ material interests. This motive is clearly 
different from logic of appropriateness. If actors use norms are used to enhance material 
interests, then norms do not have independent influence over policy. 
In an attempt to “bridge the gap across the constructivist-rationalist divide,” 
Checkel has identified three distinct types of mechanism behind policy change; in other 
words, three different pathways to changes in actors’ behavior at the state or individual 
levels. 55  Checkel and his colleagues derived their model from an analysis of how 
participation in international organizations such as the European Union could create 
policy changes in member states in accordance with EU’s norms and institutions. They 
refer to this change as socialization which is “a process of inducting actors into the norms 
and rules of a given community.”56 The result of socialization is compliance with the 
rules and norms of the international organization.  
The three mechanisms of socialization/internalization are strategic 
calculation, role playing, and normative persuasion. In strategic calculation, actors 
respond to the demands of change with a cost and benefit analysis and their goal is to 
                                                   
53 Stephen Saideman, “Conclusion: Thinking Theoretically about Identity and Foreign Policy,” in Identity 
and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (eds.) Michael N. Barnett and Shibley Telhami (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002). 
54 Ibid. 
55  Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Instiutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework,” International Organization 59, no. 4 (Autumn, 2005): 801-826.  
56 Ibid. 804. 
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maximize benefits. The actors are expected to comply with normative demands if the 
benefit of compliance exceeds the cost. Thus, material incentives such as “social status,” 
financial rewards, or punishments can convince actors to change their behavior.57  
The second mechanism is role playing, wherein actors understand the kind 
of role demanded of them and fulfill that role without considering if it is right or wrong. 
Compliance has become a habit for them. Checkel adds that the existence of a role playing 
mechanism suggests that actors have started to internalize external norms and rules. Role 
playing can be seen as an intermediary step between strategic calculation and full-fledged 
internalization.58  
The final mechanism proposed by Checkel is persuasion. Checkel point out 
that in persuasion, actors change their preferences because the power of ideas appeal to 
recipient actors. They adopt a given norm because they are convinced in the rightness or 
correctness of that particular norm. Checkel defines persuasion in the following way. 
“…argumentative persuasion is a social process of interaction that involves changing 
attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion. It is thus a mechanism 
through which preference change may occur.”59 He further adds that unlike coercion in 
persuasion actors have freedom of choice.60 Checkel identifies a number of conditions 
under which actors are more likely to change their preferences as a result of persuasion:  
 
I. The target of the socialization attempt is in a novel and 
uncertain environ- ment and thus cognitively motivated to 
analyze new information. 
II. The target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent 
                                                   
57 Ibid. 809. 
58 Ibid, 810. 
59 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change,” International 
Organization 55, no. 3 (July 2001): 562.  
60 Ibid.  
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with the socializing agency's message.  
III. The socializing agency/individual is an authoritative member 
of the ingroup to which the target belongs or wants to belong.  
IV. The socializing agency/individual does not lecture or demand 
but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative 
argument.  
V. The agency/target interaction occurs in less politicized and 
more insulated, in-camera settings.61 
   
Even though Checkel separates the three types of mechanism, the difference 
between role play and persuasion does seem to be clear-cut and it is extremely difficult 
to demonstrate empirically whether actors change their behavior as a result of persuasion 
through argumentation or role play. For empirical evidence, we can only rely on what the 
actors say, in other words, how they justify the change in their behavior in political 
speeches. If they justify their actions by referring to the need of fulfilling a certain role 
rather than to the appropriateness of the ideas they adopt, then, perhaps it can be said that 
the role playing mechanism is at work rather than normative persuasion. Examining 
speeches helps to understand what kind of logic is emphasized. Still, speeches alone are 
not sufficient evidence to claim that one mechanism prevails over the other.  
On the other hand, the distinction between the mechanisms of strategic 
calculation and persuasion seems to be clearer. If persuasion is the mechanism behind 
behavioral change, then there should be no material gains acquired as a result of a change 
in the actor’s position on a given policy area. The next section explains the nature of 
material incentives that can be used to change actors’ preferences, in particular those of 
political parties within the state.    
 
                                                   
61 Checkel, “International Instiutions and Socialization in Europe,” 813.  
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4. Rational Choice Approach: Material Incentives and Change in Domestic 
Actors’ Foreign Policy Preferences  
Both Neo-realist and Neo-liberal scholars who have adopted the rational 
choice approach have been mostly skeptical of norms as independent sources of policy 
change, but Neo-liberals acknowledge the constraining effect of norms.62 According to 
Neoliberals, states create rules to make cooperation possible which, in turn, work in the 
common interest of actors. When the initial rule creation phase is over, the rules, or the 
organizations which are in charge of implementing those rules, take on a life of their own. 
In this phase, the rules function as constraints on state behavior. This is the main 
mechanism through which international regimes shape state policy. Nevertheless, both 
Neo-realists and Neo-liberals believe that states act in accordance with norms only if it is 
in the states’ interest. Both groups reject the constitutive effect of norms meaning that 
norm-abiding behavior can change actors’ identity.63  
In the rational-choice model, actors make decisions based on strategic 
calculation. Actors change their preferences if material incentives arise that could disrupt 
the cost and benefit balance. What kind of material incentives could disrupt such balance? 
Checkel listed social status, financial rewards and punishment as material incentives that 
can change actors’ preference.   
Rational-choice theorists have argued that the nature of political interaction 
among actors in a given domestic setting depends on the type of actors who have the 
authority to make decisions and the rules that are required to make decisions. In short, 
according to rational-choice theorists, two elements are crucial in understanding the 
dynamics of interaction at the state-level: actors (decision units) and institutions (rules).  
                                                   
62 Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 27. 
63 Ibid. 
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According to Hermann, in any given state, the actors involved in the decision 
making process, or what she calls, the “authoritative decision unit,” can take three forms. 
The authoritative decision unit is “an individual or a set of individuals with the ability to 
commit the resources of the society and, when faced with a problem, the authority to 
make a decision that cannot be readily reversed.”64 The three different kinds of decision-
making unit defined by Hermann are the predominant leader, single group or a coalition 
of multiple actors.  
 
I. Predominant leader: a single individual who has the ability 
to stifle all opposition and dissent as well as the power to make a 
decision alone, if necessary.  
II. Single group: A set of individuals, all of whom are members 
of a single body, who collectively select a course of action in 
consultation with each other. 
III. Coalition of autonomous actors: The necessary actors are 
separate individuals, groups, or representatives of institutions 
which, if some or all concur, can act for the government, but no one 
of which by itself has the ability to decide and force compliance on 
others; moreover, no overarching authoritative body exists in which 
all these actors are members.65   
 
A predominant leader exists in political systems wherein a single individual 
has the authority to make a decision. Examples of such systems include, monarchies, 
authoritarian regimes or dictatorships or presidential systems, none of which apply to 
Japan.  
A single group can be a designated special group, in or outside of the 
                                                   
64 Margaret G. Herman, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” 
International Studies Review 3, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 56. 
65 Ibid: 56-57. 
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government, especially formed to deal with a policy problem. It can also be a key group 
in the bureaucracy or the cabinet.  
A coalition decision unit is where the political authority to make a decision 
is dispersed among multiple autonomous actors. Furthermore, the coalition decision unit 
does not only apply in the case of coalition governments, in fact there are four distinct 
types:  
 
I. Parliamentary democracies with multiparty cabinets,  
II. Presidential democracies with opposing legislative and 
executive branches, 
III. Authoritarian regimes in which power is dispersed across 
factions and/or institutions  
IV. Decentralized settings in which bureaucratic actors gain 
authority in collectively dealing with major policy issues.66  
 
In case of Japan’s overseas troop deployments, the coalition unit seems to 
best describe the decision unit due to the formal decision-making rules on overseas troop 
dispatches. Furthermore, in the three specific time periods under examination— 1990-92, 
2001-07, and 2007-10 — either the government was a coalition or the Diet was divided. 
Between 1990 and 1992, the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet were dominated by 
different parties. Between 2001 and 2005, coalition governments ruled, and as a result of 
the 2007 Upper House election, once again the Diet was divided.  
The main characteristic of the coalition decision unit is that any actor has the 
power to block the initiatives of others and thereby hinder the conclusion of a decision. 
This power to block might be stated in laws or based on unwritten norms. According to 
                                                   
66 Joe D. Hagan et al. “Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise and Anarchy,” International 
Studies Review 3, no.2 (Summer 2001): 169. 
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Hagan et al the actors can block the decisions in three ways:  
 
I. Executing a veto 
II. Threatening to terminate the ruling coalition 
III. Withholding the resources necessary for action or the 
approval needed for their use67  
 
Institutions or the rules defining decision-making process affect political 
interactions among the actors. They shape actors’ maneuvering capacity and the nature of 
the material incentives that could be offered to change the opposing actors’ preferences. 
Tsebelis explains the effect of decision-making rules in the following way: “rules of the 
game [define] the set of players, the set of permissible moves, the sequence of these 
moves, and the information available before each move is made.”68 
In addition, the recent scholarship on role theory and foreign policy analysis 
suggests that when state-level actors’ role conceptions are contested, foreign policy 
outcomes depend on the rules of decision-making in a given area and the structure of the 
government (such as a coalition, single party rule or a powerful individual). Actors with 
more powerful status in the domestic institutional setting are more likely to have their 
views or “role conceptions” translated into foreign policy.69 
Based on earlier coalition formation theory, Hagan et al., developed a 
“coalition decision model” in which factors affecting agreement between actors are 
dependent on the decision-making rules, meaning “number of votes required to win a 
debate.” These rules can take three forms: unanimity, majority and anarchy (the lack of 
                                                   
67 Ibid.: 170 
68 George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1990): 90. 
69 Cristian Cantir, and Juliet Kaarbo (eds.), Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and 
International Relations. (New York: Routledge, 2016).  
32 
 
clearly defined rules). 
If unanimity is required for voting then we are dealing with a “unit veto 
model”70. In such cases, the outcome depends on two factors: “the existence of a shared 
policy orientation” and/or “the possibility of side payments”. If there is similarity in the 
actors’ positions on a given policy issue, they are more likely to reach at an agreement. 
While this is similar to the constructivist assumption that actors with similar normative 
beliefs are more likely to cooperate, the second factor is a material incentive which has 
nothing to do with actors’ beliefs or ideas. This material incentive which could also be 
provided to a political party opposing a decision is “side-payments.” 
Material side payments can help convince actors to approve a decision. These 
are incentives offered to a “veto player” in exchange for approval of a decision. 
“Advocates of policy may be able to buy off a strong dissenter with concessions critical 
to them on another issue, something that is especially likely in the case of a smaller, 
single-issue party with critical votes.”71 For small, issue-oriented political parties these 
side payments can be in the form of the control of a single ministry or policy issue. In 
return, the small party would lend its support to the initiative proposed by a major 
coalition partner.72 Another form of material incentive can be political logrolling. Snyder 
has pointed out that foreign policy issues can also be used in logrolling.73 Putnam also 
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325. 
71 Joe D. Hagan et al. “Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise and Anarchy,” International 
Studies Review 3, no.2 (Summer 2001): 176. 
72 Barbara Hinckley, Coalition and Politics (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); Eric C. 
Brownie and John P. Frendreis, “Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of 
the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations,” American Journal of Political Science 24, no. 4: 753-
768.  
73 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Policies and International Ambition (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Pres, 1991) 
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argued that side-payments are often resorted to in “two-level games” to buy off domestic 
veto players’ approval for the ratification of international treaties.74 Thus, in rational-
choice approach, side-payments have been used as a tool to change opposing actors’ 
preferences.   
Two other types of rules discussed by Hagan et al. are majority voting and 
anarchy. If a majority vote is required, then two different set of factors come into play: 
“the presence of a pivotal actor” or “the willingness to bargain among groups”. When 
there are no clear rules for decision-making, the ‘anarchy’ type, the outcome is determined 
by the “existence of a predominant actor within the regime” or “any actor with exclusive 
control of implementing resources.”75  The model is summarized in figure 1, in the 
Appendices.  
In Japan, decisions about overseas troop dispatches are, in principle, made 
through the creation of laws in which the legislature plays a significant role through 
approval. This is because in the basic law governing the duties and actions of the Japanese 
armed forces (the SDF Law), there is no relevant clause related to overseas dispatch. 
Moreover, when a mission needs to be extended beyond its original time frame, or when 
the nature of the activities or tasks change, Diet approval is necessary.   
Until the 1990s, the SDF’s sole duty had been defined as the defense of Japan 
from direct external aggression. Overseas deployments, for whatever purpose, were 
considered against the constitution until the 1990s. With enactment of the UN PKO Law 
in 1992, the SDF were dispatched to peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, 
                                                   
74 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization 42, no.3 (Summer 1988): 427-460. 
75 This part is a summary of Joe D. Hagan et al. “Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise 
and Anarchy,” International Studies Review 3, no.2 (Summer 2001): 176-79. 
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and election observations. This law not only restricts the duties of the SDF but also 
requires prior Diet approval before each deployment. For missions other than those 
covered by the UN PKO Law, it is necessary to enact a separate law is necessary. In this 
sense, the Diet, the legislative organ in Japan, plays an important role in the decision-
making process for dispatching the SDF abroad.  
It is important to understand how the law-making process works in Japan and 
the actors involved. In Japan, the Cabinet delegates the task of drafting bills to the relevant 
ministry— in the case of security issues, this is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter 
MOFA). However, in the case of the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law, it was the 
Cabinet who created the initial draft bill in consultation with MOFA.  
Once a draft is approved by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and accepted by 
the Cabinet members, it is submitted to either one of the two chambers of the Diet: the 
House of Representatives (HoR) or the House of Councilors (HoC). The President of the 
Chamber (or the House) refers the bill to an appropriate committee for examination. 
Depending on the need, this can be a standing committee or a temporary special 
committee. After deliberations, a vote is held. If the law passes through both the special 
committee and the plenary session of that Chamber with a simple majority, then, it is sent 
to the other Chamber. Here, the same procedure applies; namely, a vote at the committee 
and plenary sessions. If the bill passes through both chambers, then, it becomes a law.76  
At the Diet, the government members put the case for the necessity of the 
dispatch and the opposition parties can question the views presented by the government, 
as in other parliamentary systems. During this process, the opposition parties’ views and 
                                                   
76 Official website of the Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau, The Law Making Process, accessed 
November 8, 2015  http://www.clb.go.jp/english/process.html  
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public scrutiny become important factors. A number of actors are involved including the 
Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministry (previously Defense 
Agency) through their connections with the Cabinet and the Diet (including the 
opposition parties).  
In the time periods under examination, two of the coalition types described 
by Hagan et al. were present, plus a combination of the two. First, during the first time 
period (T 1 = 1990-92), there was LDP dominated single party rule, without a majority in 
the Upper House, creating a situation similar to a divided government. The divided 
government occurs in the United States when the Congressional and the Presidential 
positions are controlled by opposing parties.77  
In Japan, a similar situation occurs when there is a divided legislature (nejire 
kokkai in Japanese meaning twisted Diet) that is the Lower House is controlled by the 
ruling party or parties and the Upper House by the opposition party or parties. In such a 
case, the bill approved in the Lower House could be rejected in the Upper House; however, 
Article 59 of the Japanese Constitution states that a bill rejected in the Upper House could 
be passed by a second vote in the Lower House, by a two thirds majority of members 
present.78  
The second period covers a longer time period (2001-2007) because it 
includes the enactment and all the extensions of the special measures law authorizing the 
overseas dispatch. Between 2001 and 2006, the Koizumi administration was in power in 
a multi-party coalition government including initially the LDP and the Conservative Party 
                                                   
77 James Meernik, “Congress, the President and the Commitment of the U.S. Military,” Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 20, no.3 (August, 1995): 377-392.  
78 Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, “The Constitution of Japan” (English version), 
accessed August 1, 2015. 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html 
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(Hoshūtō). In 2003, the Conservative Party had joined the LDP, thereafter the coalition 
government had included only the two parties rendering the Kōmeitō as the only veto 
player. In that context only the consent of Komeito was sufficient to pass a bill.  
In September 2006, Shinzo Abe replaced Koizumi as the Prime Minister. 
Following the 2007 Upper House elections, the DPJ attained the majority of the seats 
which once again produced a divided legislature. However, the DPJ was only able to 
attain a with the other two opposition parties (People’s New Party and the Social 
Democratic Party of Japan) was able to attain a two thirds majority. Thus, it is helpful to 
consider the time periods separately as T-2 = 2001-2007, and T-3 = 2007-2010. In T-2, 
the decision-making rules were based on a unanimity vote. The consent of the members 
of the coalition are required. Under T-3, decision-making still requires unanimity within 
the ruling coalition but a majority in the Diet. Even if the Constitution allows a second 
vote in the Lower House when a bill is rejected in the Upper House, politicians rarely 
follow this path and initially seek dialogue and negotiations with the opposition parties. 
If the dialogue is unfruitful, then they will resort to a second vote.    
In conclusion, there are two competing perspectives on changes in domestic 
actors’ preferences about foreign policy issues. A constructivist perspective considers 
persuasion as the main mechanism behind change in actors’ preferences whereas a 
rational-choice approach points to material incentives such as side-payments, 
punishments and threats.  
 
5. Description of Method and Data  
The purpose of this research is to understand how it was possible for 
successive LDP-led governments to change the preferences of the opposition parties and 
37 
 
to understand the conditions under which domestic veto-players are more-likely to change 
their preferences. The study is a single case study of Japan; and, the case is divided into 
three separate time periods. The enactment period of the UN PKO Law is in the first time 
period (T-1=1990-1992). The second time period covers the enactment of the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law and its extensions until the 2007 Upper House election 
(T-2 =2001-2007). Finally, the third time period starts in 2007 with the enactment of a 
law replacing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and ends with that law’s 
termination in 2010 (T-3= 2007-2010).   
The main method used in this study is process tracing which is an appropriate 
tool to investigate causal mechanisms in a single case. According to George and Bennet, 
“the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the 
causal chain and causal mechanisms— between an independent variable (or variables) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable.”79  
Before explaining the method in detail, the concept of causal mechanism 
needs to be clarified. Beach and Pedersen distinguish between causal mechanism and 
causality. Their explanation can be summarized in the following way. Causality in large-
n statistical analysis and comparative case study research is understood as “a regular 
association between X and Y, controlled for other relevant possible causes.”80 In order to 
establish a causality, Hume’s three conditions on the relationship between X and Y need 
to be proved: “(1) X and Y must be contiguous in space and time; (2) X occurs before Y 
(temporal succession); and (3) a regular conjunction exists between X and Y.” 81 A 
                                                   
79 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005): 206. 
80 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2013): 24 
81 Ibid., 25. This quote is based on Paul W. Holland, “Statistics and Causal Inference,” Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 81, no: 396: 945-960.  
38 
 
causal mechanism is ontologically different from causality. It is not about a relationship 
of regularity pattern. It is the mechanism linking X to Y.  
Another distinction made by Beach and Petersen, between causality as 
understood in statistical analysis, and causal mechanism in qualitative case studies is 
about whether they are probabilistic or deterministic. Statistical, large-n studies postulate 
probabilistic causal relations between X and Y. They test their theories across a wide 
range of cases to understand the probability of X producing Y. These theories also accept 
both systematic (patterned, non-random) and nonsystematic (random) relations. X may 
not always produce Y. In contrast, case study researchers, think that there is no sense in 
understanding probabilistic relations in small-n case studies, their purpose is rather to find 
out necessary and sufficient conditions by comparing a small number of cases. In Beach 
and Pedersen’s words: 
 
…what we are examining is not whether a given X tends to covary 
with Y in a population but whether X is either a necessary and/or 
sufficient cause of Y in an individual case…A condition is 
necessary if the absence of it prevents an outcome, regardless of the 
values of other variables, whereas if a sufficient condition is present, 
the outcome will always take place. 82 
 
In case studies, be they small-n or single case, the main goal is to clarify the 
causal mechanism. To further explain the causal mechanism concept, Beach and Pedersen 
use the “toothed wheel” analogy. Their explanation is that, an entire causal mechanism 
can be thought of as a toothed wheel in which each wheel represents a part of the causal 
mechanism. Parts of the mechanism can be considered as “entities engaging in activities” 
                                                   
82 Ibid.: 27 
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that transfer the causal energy to the next component.83 Beach and Pedersen explain, 
notion of causal mechanism in the following way: 
  
Each part of a mechanism can be illustrated as (nn  ), where the 
nn refers to the entity (n) and the arrow to the activity transmitting 
causal energy through the mechanism to produce an outcome. * is 
used to refer to the logical and.   
 
X  [(n1 ) * (n2 )] Y  
 
This should be read as X transmits causal forces through the 
mechanism composed of part I (entity I and an activity) and part 2 
(entity 2 and an activity) that together contribute to producing 
outcome Y.  
… 
Each part of the mechanism is by itself insufficient to produce an 
outcome Y, as it only functions together with the rest of the 
“machine.” Second, explicit in a mechanismic ontology is a view 
that the parts that we include in our conceptualization of a given 
causal mechanism are absolutely vital (necessary) for the machine 
to work, and in the absence of one part, the mechanism itself cannot 
be said to exist.84  
 
Having clarified the notion of a causal mechanism adopted in this study, the next 
task is to clarify the type of process tracing method used. In George and Bennett, process-
tracing can be used for two different purposes: theory testing or theory building. In this 
study, a theory-testing process tracing is used. Theory testing process tracing is used “to 
see whether causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in 
                                                   
83 Ibid.: 29 
84 Ibid.: 30. 
40 
 
the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”85 Thus, the analyst 
investigates whether a causal process—the steps by which an independent variable is 
linked to a dependent variable— exists in a given case or not. Here, identifying the order 
in which the events unfold (sequence) is very important in determining the intermediary 
steps.  
Consequently, theory-testing is based on deductive logic in which the 
observable implications of a theory are tested in a single case or in a small-n study.  In 
other words, we move down from theory to the particular case, instead of going up from 
case to theory. However, in this research, instead of using induction in its purest sense, an 
abductive approach is used by looking at the case and the available theories of foreign 
policy analysis and uses an iterative process between case and theory. Abduction can be 
explained as follows:  
 
…social scientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomenon 
that interests us for some reason, but for which we lack applicable 
theories. We simply trust, although we do not know for certain, that 
the observed class of phenomenon is not random. We therefore start 
collecting pertinent observations, and at the same time, applying 
concepts from existing fields of our knowledge. Instead of trying to 
impose an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or “simply” 
inferring propositions from facts (induction), we start reasoning at 
an intermediate level (abduction).86 
 
According to Beach and Pedersen, George and Bennett’s understanding of 
                                                   
85 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005): 6.  
86 Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance 
International Relations Research and Methodology,” International Organization 63, no.4 (Fall, 2009): 
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causal relationships as “intermediary steps” or “a series of intervening variables” is 
different from their own view of causal mechanisms. They argue that a causal mechanism 
should not merely state the presence of an intervening variable between X and Y but 
demonstrate how that variable produces a causal force in the form of entities engaging in 
activities.  
In order to test the validity of the causal mechanism we need to derive 
“predictions” or “observable implications” for each part of the hypothesized mechanism. 
In other words, we need to specify the kind of evidence we expect to find in the case at 
hand if the causal mechanism tested holds true. Beach and Pedersen indicate that four 
different kinds of evidence is required for a satisfactory application of the process tracing 
method: pattern, sequence, trace, and account.  
Beach and Pedersen define each type in the following way. “Pattern evidence 
relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence.”87 However, this evidence 
type would be appropriate for testing parts of the mechanism, not the whole. Sequence is 
understood in the same way as in George and Bennett, which is defined above. Next, they 
distinguish between trace and account evidence in the following way:  
 
“Trace evidence is evidence whose mere existence provides proof 
that a part of hypothesized mechanism exists. For example, the 
existence of the official minutes of a meeting, if authentic, provides 
strong proof that a meeting took place. Finally, account evidence 
deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting 
minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what 
took place.”88  
 
                                                   
87 Beach and Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: 99 
88 Ibid.: 100 
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Going back to the two competing hypotheses and the observable implications 
that could be drawn from them; material incentives and persuasion. If persuasion is the 
sole mechanism behind preference change, then a change in actors’ normative beliefs as 
a result of argumentation. Furthermore, no material gains made by the domestic opposing 
actors/veto players are expected. If material incentives, are the mechanism, then a change 
in stance following a material gain is expected. Any kind of material gain should precede 
the change of stance. These material incentives could be side-payments or logrolling. 
Types of coercion including punishing, blackmailing or shaming could be considered as 
material factors as they are clearer in nature to losses on the part of domestic actors, than 
ideational changes.  
In order to test the predicted implications, three types of evidence are looked 
at: sequence and account and in some cases trace. In both time frames, the events are in 
chronological order mostly based on newspaper articles. In each this showed that veto 
players changed their normative positions after an opportunity to enhance their political 
power arose, or in the presence of a material incentive. Even though normative persuasion 
took place, this was not automatically followed by a change in veto players’ normative 
beliefs. Consequently, the normative persuasion mechanism was rendered redundant. 
Account evidence was used to show certain meetings took place between the leaders of 
the ruling and opposition parties and how their views on policy changed following those 
meetings were indicated. However, in most cases, the trace evidence is not given as I did 
not have access to the content of those meetings via sources alternative to newspaper 
articles. Therefore, information gathered from newspaper articles can be triangulated with 
interviews with the political elite in a future study.  
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6. Limitations of This Study and Research Tasks Ahead  
One of the main limitations of this study revolves around the data used. This 
study relies on publicly available sources such as newspaper articles, Diet speeches and 
books or articles written by other scholars in order to give chronological order to the 
events that took place. In order to increase the validity of this papers’ claims, interviews 
with key politicians/members of parliament who took part in the processes of enacting 
the laws or negotiations as well as key internal documents of the “veto players” such as 
Komeito and the DPJ should be conducted. Evidence from such interviews would add 
another dimension to the main arguments.   
Another limitation of the study is the time span covered. Japanese troops were 
sent to participate in reconstruction activities in Iraq while the war was still continuing. 
This was considered to be a violation of traditional pacifist norms that forbade Japan to 
send troops to a combat zone. Furthermore in 2015, the overseas roles of the armed forces 
were further expanded with the enactment of new security legislation. These episodes 
should also be examined to provide an updated analysis of the issue. As Beach and 
Pedersen note “A longer-term mechanism will look very different from a short-term 
mechanism; in particular, these differences manifest themselves in the types of observable 
implications that an incremental, long-term mechanism will be expected to have in 
comparison to a short-term mechanism.”89  
Finally, the study is limited in the sense that two competing theories on 
domestic actors’ preference are tested with the evidence from Japan only. Additional cases 
from other states which have institutionalized pacifist state identities similar to Japan can 
be investigated to increase the plausibility of the main argument.  
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7. Conclusion  
The purpose of this research is to provide an understanding of how it was 
possible for successive LDP governments to expand the overseas military roles of the 
SDF despite strong domestic opposition. In particular, the main focus of the study is to 
understand how the ruling LDP succeeded in convincing the opposition parties whose 
votes were indispensable for the approval of the laws authorizing dispatches.  
Two competing hypotheses with respect to the change in state level actors’ 
views on foreign policy are derived, one from the constructivist approach and the other 
from rational choice theory. Constructivism emphasizes persuasion as a way of changing 
actors’ stance. Constructivist scholars believe that actors are persuaded through 
arguments in the goodness or rightness of normative beliefs. On the other hand, rational 
choice theorists argue that material incentives such as side payments, opportunities to 
enhance social status or political logrolling are important mechanisms behind changes in 
actors’ stances on foreign policy issues.  
The following chapters will investigate the absence/presence of these two rival 
mechanisms in the case of Japan’s overseas troop deployments. Three sub-periods are 
examined. The next chapter will examine the enactment process of the UN PKO Law 
which authorized troop dispatches in support of UN PKOs. The third chapter examines 
the period from the enactment of the UN PKO Law up until the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks. The purpose of the third chapter is to explain the changes in the domestic 
political power distribution and views on state identity. The fourth chapter investigates 
the second and third sub-cases. The second sub-case is the enactment and extensions of 
the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Finally, the third sub-case is the termination 
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of the Anti-Terrorism Law and the enactment of a replacement law in the context of 
divided legislature.  
The study is limited in three aspects. Firstly, the data excludes important 
primary sources such as accounts of politicians who participated in the political process. 
Such data could be acquired through interviews. Secondly, the time span covered is 
limited and excludes the more recent developments and thirdly, the plausibility of the 
arguments could be improved by analyzing additional cases other than Japan. In view of 
these limitations, we cannot say that the presence of the causal mechanism is 
demonstrated at a satisfactory level. Future research could be conducted to ameliorate 
these limitations.  
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Chapter 2 
The Enactment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Law (1990-1992) 
Normative Shift or Political Survival? 
 
1. Introduction  
In Japan, the first law which allowed overseas troop dispatches in support of 
international military operations was the UN PKO law. The law was established in the 
aftermath of the Persian Gulf War.90 Faced with immense US-pressure, the Japanese 
government decided to prepare a legal framework to authorize troop contributions to 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.  
This chapter focuses on the legislative process behind the enactment of that 
law in order to understand how it was possible for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) to overcome enormous political opposition. The majority of the opposition parties 
of that time considered the SDF members’ participation in UN PKOs as a violation of 
Article 9 of the Constitution. In their first trial, the LDP executives failed to pass the law 
but in their second attempt they succeeded and the law was enacted in June 1992, almost 
two years after the outbreak of the Persian Gulf Crisis. In order to pass the law, the LDP 
had to cooperate with the opposition parties as the structure of the Diet— namely, divided 
legislature— did not allow the LDP to act alone. The LDP lacked a two-thirds majority 
                                                   
90 Here, it is significant to note that prior to the Persian Gulf Crisis, within Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs ideas about how Japan could participate in UN peacekeeping operations were discussed and the 
also the establishment of such a law were considered. For more information about the history of such 
attempts see: Akihiko Tanaka, “The Domestic Context: Japanese Politics and U.N. Peacekeeping,” in UN 
Peacekeeping Japanese and American Perspectives (eds.) Selig S. Harrison and Masashi Nishihara 
(Washington: Carneige Endowment for International Peace, 1995): 89-105; Milton Leitenberg, “The 
Participation of Japanese Military Forces in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” Asian Perspective 
20, no.1 (Spring-Summer 1996): 5-50; L. William Heinrich, Jr., Akiho Shibata and Yoshihide Soeya L. 
(eds.) United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Guide to Japanese Politics (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press, 1999) 
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in the Lower House and the Upper House was dominated by the opposition parties; 
therefore for an approval in the Upper House, the LDP depended on the votes from the 
opposition. Consequently, the LDP was forced to cooperate with opposition parties. 
The LDP chose to cooperate with the Komeito and DSP, two smaller 
opposition parties. How did the government manage to convince these two parties? What 
made the parties change their stances in the second time around? Did the parties change 
their opinion as a result of normative persuasion or material benefits offered by the ruling 
LDP in return for their support?  
The main argument of the chapter is that the ruling LDP’s strategies to 
overcome the restrictions imposed by the structure of the Diet was a key factor behind 
the passage of the law. However, these strategies were not only limited to normative 
persuasion as previously pointed out by constructivist scholars. Material side-payments 
and political threats were key factors in securing two parties’ cooperation with the LDP.  
In particular, the LDP threatened the smaller opposition parties and groups in 
the Upper House with holding simultaneous elections. The simultaneous elections could 
have been detrimental to the survival of smaller parties’ in the Upper House. This 
blackmailing strategy not only broke the deadlock between the Komeito and DSP over 
the talks on the bill and forced them to cooperate with the LDP, but also prevented smaller 
groups from blocking the voting in the Upper House. Thus, the smaller political parties’ 
consideration of their political survival was the key factor in pushing them toward 
cooperation with LDP. The fact that the LDP strategically used both normative and 
material incentives to convince the opposition parties shows that normative factors alone 
were insufficient to produce policy change. 
This chapter is organized in the following way. In the first section, the actors 
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involved in the legislative process are introduced, their powers are explained based on 
their presence in both Houses of the Diet, and the possible policy outcomes under divided 
legislature are discussed. In the second section, Japan’s responses during Persian Gulf 
Crisis are examined up until the end of November 1990 when the first bill was aborted in 
the Diet. The next section provides an account of how the SDF minesweeper was 
dispatched to the Gulf after the end of combat. The final section examines the legislative 
process behind the UN PKO Law and particular attention given to the ways in which the 
LDP galvanized the support of two smaller opposition parties, namely, the Komeito and 
DSP.  
2. Domestic Actors, Their Powers and Possible Policy Outcomes  
Before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf Crisis how was the structure of the 
government and the Diet? Who were the actors involved in the law-making process for 
overseas troop dispatches? In other words, who were the authoritative decision unit at 
that time?  
The major actors which dominated the Japanese political scene at that time 
were the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) as the 
largest opposition party, the Komeito as the second largest opposition party, the 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Japan Communist Party (JCP), Shaminren and finally 
the Rengo Sangiin.  
The biggest and longest-ruling party in Japan, the LDP is divided within itself 
into various factions. There are two different views as to whether the relation between 
factions and policy positions. The first and more widely accepted view among the 
scholars of Japanese politics suggests that factions are not formed based on differences in 
ideology and policy positions but based on material interests. The other views suggests 
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that factions have distinct policy positions. For the present analysis, the ideological 
differences within the LDP do not matter, only the party leaders’ views and the official 
government position are taken into account throughout the political process. The relevant 
question for this analysis is that how the government manage to convince the opposition 
parties to pass the law rather than how LDP overcame its internal divisions.  
The JSP also has factions, however, in national defense and security issues, 
the party had displayed a united and uniform stance throughout the 1980s and until 1994. 
This stance has been called the “unarmed neutrality” which was based on abrogating the 
US-Japan Security Treaty, preventing Japan’s rearmament, preventing the revision of 
Article 9, and eliminating the SDF as they believed the organization to be unconstitutional. 
Komeito as the only religious party in Japan has been mainly supported by 
the Soka Gakkai (the Value Creation Society), an organization that believes in the 
teachings of Nichiren Buddhism and remodeling of individual lifestyles and Japanese 
political system based on religious beliefs. In foreign policy, the party and its support base 
have emphasized pacifism. Similar to JSP, the Komeito had exhibited a stance against the 
presence of the SDF. However, as early as the 1980s, the party changed its stance. As 
Curtis indicated: “At the nineteenth [party] congress in December 1981, the party 
accepted the [US-Japan Security] treaty in its present form and dropped demands for its 
abrogation.” (Curtis) 
Finally, the Rengo Sangiin was not a political party but a political group 
backed by Japan’s labor union federation Rengo, also known as the Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation. Rengo was rather young at that time, established only two years ago with 
the merger of the two biggest labor unions in Japan. As an election strategy before the 
1989 Upper House election, smaller parties in constituencies where they did not have a 
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chance to beat the LDP candidate united their votes for a single candidate against LDP. 
In this way they succeeded in gaining twelve seats out of the 13 constituencies in which 
they run for election. The candidates belonged to various small parties including JSP, 
Komeito, DSP, and United Social Democratic Party.91  
Thus, the Rengo Sangiin members did not have common views on policy 
issues. Nevertheless, Rengo, headed by Akira Yamagishi, was also involved in the public 
discussions on the UN PKO bill and was a major actor in trying to unite the opposition 
with various strategies throughout the two years of discussions on the law. The Rengo 
especially wanted a unity between the JSP and the DSP which were the parties closest to 
Rengo. Therefore, it tried to prevent the DSP from coalescing with the LDP and Komeito.  
As a consequences of the February 18, 1990 Lower House election, the 
distribution of the seats were in the following way. First, in the Lower House the ruling 
LDP held 281 seats out of 512 which was sufficient to approve a bill but insufficient to 
override the Upper House. The largest opposition party, JSP had 136 seats in the Lower 
House. Komeito had 45, JCP held 16, and DSP 14. The distribution of the seats as a result 
of the Lower House election is demonstrated in the Table 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
91 “Time Running Out // For Peacekeeping Bill // The Bickering in the Diet,” Daily Yomiuri, June 1, 
1992, 2.  
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Table 2.1. Results of 18 February 1990 Lower House Election 
 
Political Group Number of Seats in the House 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 275 
Socialist Party of Japan (JSP) 136 
Komeito 45 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 16 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 14 
United Socialist Democratic Party  4 
Progressive Party 1 
Independents 21 
 
(Source: Interparliamentary Union)92 
The opposition parties controlled the Upper House. LDP held 109 out of the 
252 seats in the House. The JSP held 66. The second largest opposition was the Komeito 
which held 20 seats Next, the JCP and DSP held 14 and 8 seats respectively. The Rengo 
had 10 in the Upper House which is counted within the group of “other parties” in the 
below table. The below table indicates the distribution of seats summarized above.93  
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Table 2.2. Results of 23 July 1989 Upper House Election 
 
Political Group Number of Seats in the House 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 109 
Socialist Party of Japan (JSP) 66 
Komeito 20 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 14 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 8 
Other Parties 22 
Independents 21 
 
(Source: Interparliamentary Union)94 
 
Thus, while the LDP held the majority of seats in the Lower House, in the 
Upper House the opposition parties constituted the majority, which created the situation 
of the twisted Diet. As explained in the first chapter, in case of twisted Diet, Japan’s 
Constitution allows a law to be passed with a two thirds majority vote in the Lower House 
upon rejection in the Upper House. However, the LDP lacked the two-thirds majority, 
thus it was forced by the structure of the Diet, to cooperate with the minor opposition 
parties to attain the “minimum required vote.” Consequently, the opposition parties were 
given a great deal of leverage in negotiations; and thereby, became veto players as 
reaching a decision depended on their approval as well. Thus, the authoritative decision 
unit, in this case, resembled to the type two described by Hagan et al.: Presidential 
democracies with opposing legislative and executive branches. Even though the system 
of government is not presidential in Japan like that in the United State, the twisted Diet 
condition coupled with LDP’s lack of sufficient seats in the Lower House to override the 
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Upper one created a situation similar to the one in United States.  
As explained in the first chapter, under coalition decision units, the actors 
have various tools to block a decision. These are exercising the formal veto power, 
threats to end the coalition if the actors are partners in a coalition government, and 
exploiting other procedural rules. In this case, the two Houses of the Diet were controlled 
by different parties. In the Lower House the LDP had the majority of seats but lacked a 
two-thirds majority by which it could override a rejection in the Upper House. In the 
Upper House, the opposition parties as a whole constituted the majority. Therefore, the 
LDP needed to cooperate with some of the opposition parties to acquire the sufficient 
amount of votes to pass the legislation in the Upper House. LDP would settle for a 
“minimum required majority” 
Against this backdrop, if we expect the rational choice explanation to be true, 
then the opposition parties which cooperated with the LDP should not have received any 
material gains before or after their cooperation. Alternatively, if we expect the 
Constructivist argument to be true, then we would expect to see a change in the stance 
of the opposition parties as a result of persuasion and there should be no material gains 
acquired. In order to test the plausibility of each predicted mechanism, the enactment 
process of the UN PKO law is examined from 1990 untill 1992.  
 
3. First Failed Attempt for a UN PKO Law: The Opposition Parties as Veto 
Players (August 1990- November 1991)  
When the Persian Gulf crisis broke out on August 2 1990, the incumbent 
Kaifu Cabinet responded by imposing economic sanctions, extending financial 
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assistance,95 and finally drafting a bill which would allow troop contributions to the US-
led international military force deployed in the Persian Gulf. 
As a response to Iraqi regime’s aggression, the United Nations Security 
Council adopted Resolution 660 which set a deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. 
The Kaifu Cabinet was among the first to impose sanctions against the Iraqi regime by 
risking its vested economic interests in Iraq and the lives of Japanese citizens which were 
held as hostages in the both Iraq and Kuwait.  
 Nevertheless, sanctions alone were not considered sufficient by the US-side 
and as the crisis ensued, the US administration exerted increasing pressure on the Kaifu 
Cabinet in various ways for more tangible support. By mid-August, dissatisfied with 
Japan’s response, the U.S. administration called for a “direct contribution to the defense 
of the Gulf” from Japan which included:  
I. Financial assistance to the U.S.-led multinational forces in 
Saudi Arabia. 
II. Direct contribution to the defense of the Gulf region in 
various ways  
III. Financial assistance to surrounding countries 
IV. A detailed plan for sharing the costs of U.S. forces stationed 
in Japan over the next five years  
V. Commitments on buying major U.S.-made weapons systems, 
including airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) planes 
and aerial refueling tankers, during the next Japanese defense 
buildup.96 
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Moreover, the US administration initiated a full-fledged diplomatic assault 
against the Japanese government. Shinoda notes that the United States administration sent 
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of Treasury to demand an increase in financial assistance97; 
however, this was rejected by the Japanese Minister of Finance Ryutaro Hashimoto. Later 
on, by September 12, the United States’ Senate passed a resolution demanding the 
withdrawal of all US forces stationed in Japan had Japan not increased its financial 
assistance. As a result the financial assistance was increased in response to US pressure.98 
Moreover, Shinoda noted that then US ambassador in Japan, Michael Armacost, handed 
a letter to then Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama in a meeting held on 
August 15 which included demand both troop and financial contributions.99 Dobson also 
revealed that a team of top US state officials who visited Japan by mid-August demanded 
troop contributions.100 Furthermore, he showed that suggestions for troop dispatches to 
Japan were made by Canadian and Australian governments.101  
Faced with US pressure, within the LDP, the discussions on the possibility of 
troop dispatches and its legal basis began. Three proposals were considered. The first was 
to send SDF minesweepers to the Gulf as proposed by the chairman of the LDP Policy 
Research Council, Michio Watanabe. This suggestion was based on a view expressed 
during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88).  In a House of Representatives Cabinet Committee 
meeting, then Prime Minister Nakasone mentioned that sending SDF minesweepers to 
the Gulf did not breach the Constitution and could be considered as an act of self-defense 
as Japanese ships use that route for transportation of oil. This idea was considered 
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legitimate as it did not involve the use of force.102 Watanabe also suggested that Japan 
should send a medical team and assist the transportation of food and fuel for U.S. 
forces.103  
Second, the former Deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru expressed the 
necessity to change the Constitution in order to allow the SDF to participate in a possible 
international coalition to be sent to the Gulf region.104  
Third, Ichiro Ozawa, the then LDP Secretary General, advocated the idea that 
sending the SDF to participate in a UN force did not violate the Constitution and could 
be justified based on the UN Charter.105 Ozawa’s argument was based on changing the 
interpretation of the Article 9 of the constitution. The new interpretation made a 
distinction between “collective security” and “collective defense” and suggested that UN 
peacekeeping activities fell under the category of collective security. According to him, 
SDF’s participation in collective security missions did not breach Article 9. Participating 
in collective defense related arrangements, on the other hand, was considered as a 
violation of the Constitution.106  
While the discussions were still in progress, finally on 29 August 1990, the 
Kaifu Administration announced the Government’s six-point action plan which revealed 
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the government’s intention to create a law that would authorize troop dispatches. The six-
point action plan was in the following way:  
 
I. Provision of supplies and goods to the international military 
force such as food, water and medical supplies as well as provision 
of civilian aircraft and ships to be used for transportation activities 
II. Provision of funds for transportation of Egyptian laborers in 
Kuwait returning to their country  
III. Dispatching a team of medical personnel to Saudi Arabia in 
assistance for refugee relief 
IV. Extension of financial assistance to surrounding countries of 
Jordan, Egypt and Turkey 
V. Provision of around 1.5 billion yen worth of aid to the 
refugees in Jordan 
VI. Creation of a basic law for international cooperation107 
 
The end result of the Kaifu Cabinet’s studies was the “UN Peace Cooperation 
Bill” which aimed at the formation of a Peace Cooperation Corps— comprised of 
voluntary participants including civilians and members of the SDF. The government 
completed the draft bill on October 15 after changing its content for several times and 
submitted the final draft to the House of Representatives, the next day, during an 
extraordinary session of the Diet.  
The discussions on the content of the law concentrated on four points: the 
participation of the SDF in the Corps, the type of activities which the Corps would be 
allowed to undertake, the command and control structure of the Corps, and finally the use 
of weapons by the Corps.  
First, the Corps would be comprised of civil servants from various fields 
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(Article 32), the Japan Coast Guard (Article 20) and Self-Defense Forces (Article 22). 
The SDF members participating in the Corps would be able to maintain their status and 
identity as an SDF member and Peace Corps member (in Japanese this dual status is called 
heinin). 108  Second, the draft bill stated that the Peace Corps would be allowed to 
undertake non-military tasks including monitoring ceasefires, providing administrative 
advice to provisional governments, election monitoring and supervision in post-conflict 
stages, medical assistance, transportation of goods and other supplies, rescue of people 
affected by conflict, and repair of damage resulting from conflict. (Article 3, para. 2)109 
Third, the decision to dispatch the Corps was going to be made by the United Nations 
Peace Cooperation Council which would be established under the Cabinet Office 
(Naikakufu).  By consulting the Prime Minister, that Council would decide the basic 
policy of peace cooperation on a case-by-case basis (Articles 4 and 5). The 
implementation plan of the cooperation activities, however, would be made by the 
“United Nations Peace Cooperation” Headquarters which would be established under the 
Prime Minister’s Office. (Article 15).110  
The purpose in placing the Corps under the command of the Prime Minister’s 
Office and not under the Defense Agency was to ensure civilian control over the Corps. 
Fourth, the Corps members would be able to carry small weapons which were the types 
allowed and specified in the relevant domestic laws (Article 27). The Head of the Peace 
Cooperation Headquarters would decide on whether the Corps could carry weapons on a 
case-by-case basis. The Corps members could use weapons in self-defense under the 
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conditions specified by domestic criminal law.111  
As the bill was being discussed in the Diet, the three largest opposition 
parties, JSP, JCP and the Kōmeitō were against the bill on the grounds that SDF’s 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations violated the Constitution’s pacifist 
principles. The three parties agreed on that Japan should provide non-military cooperation 
through UN but not participate in military operations in any form.112 The JCP referred to 
the Upper House resolution adopted in 1954 which banned the overseas dispatch of 
SDF.113 Also, the opposition parties were against arming the Peace Corps. With respect 
to material cooperation, the opposition parties demanded the exclusion of transportation 
of weapons and ammunitions from the materials that could be supplied by the SDF.114 
Komeito suggested that Japan could cooperate with UN mandated PKOs in non-military 
areas but not with other international military forces such as the US-led military force 
deployed in the Gulf.115 In that sense, the Komeito exhibited a milder stance, compared 
to JSP and JCP by showing approving contributions to UN mandated PKOs.   
Komeito set out a number of conditions before giving its consent to SDF’s 
participation including making the law a special measures law limited to a certain period 
of time; limiting SDF’s participation to members who left their job or retired; and limiting 
the Corps’ duties to non-military tasks116 The DSP’s general stance was not against the 
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SDF’s participation in the international military force but it requested revision of the bill 
in three points. (1) The SDF would be unarmed (2) The Corps would be placed under the 
command of the Prime Minister (3) Diet approval would be attained before each dispatch 
to ensure civilian control over SDF’s overseas activities.117 
Consequently, the ruling LDP sought to compromise with the more moderate 
Komeito and DSP in order to receive the sufficient amount of votes to pass the bill in the 
Upper House. As the DSP was not against SDF’s participation but only asked for prior 
Diet approval before dispatches, the Komeito had to be convinced. In order to receive 
Komeito’s support, former deputy Prime Minister proposed to revise the bill by making 
it a temporary law instead of a permanent one and excluding the SDF from the Corps. His 
proposals, however, were rejected by the LDP Secretary General Ozawa and also by 
Komeito. 118  Komieto members were against the idea of troop dispatches to US 
commanded military force. After almost a month long deliberations in the House of 
Representatives, the bill was aborted by early November119 due to strong resistance from 
the opposition parties, especially from the JSP and Komeito.   
On the same day, “a triparty agreement” was reached between the Secretary 
Generals of LDP Ichiro Ozawa, Yuichi Ichikawa of Komeito and Keigo Ouchi of DSP to 
discuss the contents of the new bill. According to various sources the key person who 
arranged the triparty conference was Ichiro Ozawa. LDP wanted to incorporate the views 
of the more moderate opposition parties for the creation of a new bill. Shinoda indicated 
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that the text of the agreement was written by the Komeito Secretary General Ichikawa 
which was based on Doi Takako’s idea of establishing a separate organization from the 
SDF from which personnel dispatches could be made.120  
As a result of their meetings, the three parties agreed on the establishment of 
a new organization apart from the SDF which would participate in UN PKOs and 
humanitarian relief operations based on UN resolutions as well as international disaster 
and rescue operations.121 Thus, according to the consensus achieved by the three parties 
at that time the SDF members on duty were not going to participate in the new 
organization that was going to be formed. This, however was going to change later on.  
 
4. Dispatching the SDF Minesweepers to the Persian Gulf (January 1991- 
April 1991)  
The U.S.-led coalition’s aerial and naval bombardments in Iraq started on 16 
January 1991 with the passage of the UNSC set deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from 
Kuwait. The Kaifu administration started studying Japan’s response to the war by early 
January and came up with a two-pillar plan: extending additional financial assistance for 
the multinational coalition and dispatching transport planes for transferring refugees from 
Iraq to neighboring Middle Eastern countries.  
Initially commercial aircrafts were going to be used; however, considering 
the security situation, the government decided to use SDF planes. The government 
mentioned that a request from UN was received for such dispatch and strongly 
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emphasized that this act was based on humanitarian motives and did not involve the use 
of force; and therefore did not violate the Constitution. Article 100 of the SDF Law which 
allowed the SDF’s dispatch for training purposes was considered as the legal basis for the 
dispatch. 122  Moreover, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau approved such legal 
interpretation. 123  All the opposition parties excluding the DSP were against the 
dispatch124 ; however, the government did not need to negotiate with them since the 
dispatch could be made with a cabinet resolution not with a Diet approval. For the 
approval of the financial assistance however, Komeito’s support was necessary in the 
Upper House as the LDP did not hold a majority there.  
The government then had to make concessions to Komeito and offer side-
payments. According to Inoguchi, the Government offered three items to secure 
Komeito’s support for passing the extended financial assistance at the Diet: The 
Government agreed not to raise taxes on tobacco, cut the defense budget and nominated 
a candidate acceptable to Komeito as the Metropolitan Tokyo governor.125 By January 
23, the government decided to change the enforcement ordinance of the relevant article 
of the SDF Law by including refugee transportation as one of the duties of SDF.126 The 
government also announced the amount of the financial aid as 9 billion US dollars.127  
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The Gulf War ended on February 27, 1991 and the Kaifu administration later 
announced that the international organizations no longer needed the SDF transportation 
planes; thus, the revised ordinance for the purpose of dispatching the SDF transport planes 
was abolished.128 With the end of the war, the clearance of mines which had been placed 
in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88) became 
an urgent task for the international community. A number of countries had already sent 
minesweeping naval vessels to the region. By mid-March the Japanese government 
announced the necessity of dispatching SDF minesweepers instead of the transport planes. 
This idea was also supported by Keidanren which considered such operation useful to 
Japan’s own energy security.129 On 27 April 1991, a fleet of SDF minesweepers were 
dispatched to the Persian Gulf. The government legitimized this act by referring to Article 
99 of the SDF Law which allowed the SDF to undertake mine clearance activities.130 As 
the main reasons behind the dispatch, Prime Minister Kaifu referred to making an 
“international contribution” and the mission’s necessity for Japan’s own energy 
security. 131  Furthermore, the government also emphasized that the dispatch did not 
violate the Constitution and was compatible with Japan’s peace state identity.132  
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5. Establishment of the UN PKO Law: Overcoming the Opposition with 
Side-Payments (September 1991-June 1992) 
The government’s second trial to pass a PKO law turned out to be a long 
journey which took almost nine months after the failed Peace Cooperation Corps bill 
(September 1990). It started in June 1991, after the end of the Gulf War. During the 
creation process of the draft bill the views of the opposition parties— Komeito and DSP— 
were incorporated into the bill in order to secure their support during the Diet voting. 
These actor’s support were attained through both normative and material “side-payments” 
as well as through skillful political strategies that threatened the survival of the two 
opposition parties.  
On the normative side, both Komeito and DSP managed to insert limitations 
on the SDF’s activities in line with the pacifist norms they supported. The Komeito 
wanted to impose limits on the use of force and the DSP wanted to ensure civilian control 
over the SDF’s overseas activities through prior Diet approval. The government agreed 
to change the content of the bill in accordance with the two parties’ normative beliefs. On 
the material side, they managed to pave the way for political reform which was going to 
be in their advantage in the long-run as small parties. Another material gain was the 
prevention of early Upper House elections. When the talks between Komeito and DSP 
resulted in a deadlock as both sides did not want to compromise, Prime Minister 
Miyazawa strategically threatened the opposition parties with an early simultaneous 
election. If the elections were held, two smaller parties could have suffered a serious loss 
of seats. This solved the deadlock and the two party leaders agreed on accepting each 
other’s proposals. Thus, besides normative and material side payments the government 
successful exploited the weaknesses of two minor opposition parties by threatening them 
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with early elections. Below is a detailed explanation of that process.  
The end of the Gulf War triggered debates about Japan’s role in the 
international society. After the return of the SDF minesweeper fleet, public views with 
respect to SDF’s dispatch to peacekeeping operations changed in a positive way. However, 
it is rather difficult to say that change in public views was the main cause behind the 
creation of the PKO law as the ruling LDP was determined to create the law even with 
little public support. Politicians in the LDP especially worked hard to advocate the 
necessity to change the interpretation of Article 9 for various reasons such as fulfilling 
international responsibilities or for the benefit of Japan’s own national interests. They 
promoted the idea that participation in peacekeeping operations were considered as 
“common sense” in international society and Japan’s stance stood out as an exception. In 
that process, the government used external pressure to convince the public and opposition 
parties.  
By early June, the government started laying the groundwork for a new bill. 
The government proposal— decided as a result of discussions between the Cabinet Office 
and MOFA— was completed by June 27, 1991. The proposal, in line with the consensus 
reached during the triparty conference, suggested the establishment of an International 
Peace Cooperation Corps. The Corps’ duties would include participating in peacekeeping 
forces, monitoring ceasefires and elections in post-conflict stages, providing police and 
administrative tasks as well as rear-area support in medical services, construction of 
facilities, transportation, communication, refueling, and supplying equipment. An 
international peace cooperation headquarters would be established under the Prime 
Minister’s office and the head of the headquarters would be the Prime Minister. The Corps 
would be composed of civil servants, volunteers and SDF members. Thus unlike in the 
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consensus reached during the triparty conference, now Komeito agreed on the 
participation of SDF members in the Corps. The SDF members would be able to retain 
their SDF identity while participating in peacekeeping activities. The maximum number 
of personnel dispatched would be limited to 1000 people. A Diet approval and a UN 
request would be required for participation in peacekeeping forces and ceasefire 
observations. Finally, the Corps would be under the command of the Prime Minister.133 
However, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau did not accept the constitutionality 
of SDF’s full participation in PKOs and Komeito came up with additional conditions. The 
head of the Bureau at that time Atsuo Kudō stated that the SDF could only participate in 
peacekeeping operations which did not contain the use of force.134 Views within the LDP 
with respect to the extent which the SDF could participate were divided. Politicians such 
as Michio Watanabe, Ichiro Ozawa, and Kiichi Miyazaki regarded SDF’s participation 
constitutional.135 Watanabe even emphasized the possibility of constitutional revision to 
enable SDF’s participation. This idea was also supported by some segments within the 
LDP. Also, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka and his faction within the LDP criticized the Bureau’s 
position and even demanded Kudō’s removal from his post, while the then LDP Secretary 
General Keizo Obuchi supported limited participation. 136  Komeito’s views changed 
compared to its earlier stance during the discussions on the failed bill. Komeito accepted 
the constitutionality of the overseas dispatch of the SDF and the idea that the SDF 
members could retain a dual status (heinin) as members of the SDF and the Corps at the 
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same time. However, they laid down additional conditions including Diet approval for 
dispatches, an upper limit on the SDF members allowed to be sent to PKOs, limited 
participation during peace time including missions such as monitoring ceasefires and rear-
area support for the peacekeeping forces and finally reception of a request from the UN 
or an international organization.137 Komeito’s main support base a pacifist religious body 
known as the Sōka Gakkai was against the idea of SDF’s full participation.  
In response to the CLB and Komeito’s apprehensions, Prime Minister Kaifu 
announced five conditions to be met before Japan’s participation in a peacekeeping 
mission in order to avoid SDF members’ participation in missions containing the use of 
force. These conditions were initially determined as follows: 
 
I. Conclusion of a ceasefire agreement between conflicting 
parties 
II. Consent of the conflicting parties to the UN peacekeeping 
activities and Japanese forces’ participation  
III. Neutrality of the peacekeeping mission 
IV. If the above-mentioned conditions cease to exist Japan 
retains the right to withdraw from the mission 
V. In accordance with UN standards, the Corps members could 
use weapons for self-defense (minimum use of force) and could not 
use force against the conflicting parties.138 
 
In order to finalize a bill based on the government’s proposal and the views 
of the Komeito and DSP, a body (jyunbi shitsu) under the Cabinet Secretariat was 
established comprised of the heads of the relevant ministries and agencies such as the 
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MOFA, defense agency, and police department. 139  The government proposal was 
finalized on August 1, 1991140 and submitted to the ruling LDP and the opposition parties. 
141 The next day, Chief Cabinet Secretariat Sakamoto Misoji and vice-Cabinet Secretariat 
Ishihara Nobuo announced the changes in the fifth principle related to the use of weapons 
due to Constitutional restrictions. As such, the change was made in the following way: 
“the weapons could be used for the defense of the lives of the personnel [members of the 
Corps] in the minimum level necessary”142 which excluded the UN standards and more 
broad understanding of self-defense. The Cabinet was considering making the principles 
a Cabinet resolution rather than including them into the PKO law.  
The government proposed bill differed from the previously failed bill in a 
number of ways. First, in the old bill that was aborted a year ago, the Corps were allowed 
to participate in PKOs and other types of multinational forces such as the one operated 
during the Gulf War. Under the new bill, the Corps could participate in UN-led PKOs and 
humanitarian missions. Second, in the old bill there was no limit imposed on the 
maximum number of personnel to be sent whereas in the new bill an upper limit was set 
which was later decided as 2000. Third, the use of weapons were allowed to protect the 
lives of dispatched personnel in the new bill, whereas the old bill only allowed the use of 
small arms for the protection of the personnel’ s own life.  
In the final intra-party dialogue, the Komeito executives set forth three 
conditions before giving the party’s consent: prior Diet approval for each dispatch, the 
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inclusion of the government-announced five principles together with the upper limit on 
the personnel to be dispatched into the law.143 Within the LDP, views with respect to the 
necessity of prior Diet approval was divided. Some members believed that at the Cabinet 
a sufficient level of civilian control existed. MOFA also claimed that prior Diet approval 
would usually take at least a month which would delay dispatches and Japan’s 
response.144  The DSP, on the other hand, only insisted on the prior Diet approval as the 
best way to ensure civilian control over the SDF.145 There was also disagreement over 
the necessity of legalizing the five principles. LDP members were particularly wary of 
the idea of withdrawing the Japanese Corps in case of the break of the ceasefire (the first 
condition). They believed it would be inappropriate if only the Japanese forces withdrew 
in case of breakdown of a ceasefire.146 The DSP did not consider the inclusion of the five 
principles into the draft as necessary.147 The largest opposition party SDPJ was excluded 
from process of creating the bill. The JSP maintained its position with respect to the 
unconstitutionality of SDF’s participation in PKOs and the party chairman Makoto 
Tanabe repeatedly mentioned that three principles should shape Japan’s contribution 
“non-military, civilian contribution and civilian control over the military,” (higunji, 
minsei, bunmin). 148 
In consideration of the views of the three parties the Cabinet adopted the 
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revised draft bill and immediately submitted it to the Diet on September 19, 1991. In line 
with Komeito’s requests the five principles and an upper limit was incorporated into the 
law. Komeito gave up its request on the prior Diet approval before the adoption of the bill. 
149 Instead of prior Diet approval, a report to the Diet prior to a decision made by the 
Cabinet was stipulated in the bill. With respect to use of weapons the SDF members were 
allowed to use a wider range of small weapons than that of the civilian members. 
Nevertheless, they could only use weapons in self-defense. 150 
The ordinary session of the Diet was going to end on October 4. Thus, the 
deliberations on the bill was delayed to the extraordinary session of the Diet which was 
scheduled to be held between November 5 and December 10.151 By the end of October, 
the minesweepers that had been dispatched to the Persian Gulf returned to Japan.152 Also 
on October 27, as a result of the LDP presidential elections Kiichi Miyazawa became the 
new prime minister thanks to the support of the Takeshita faction headed by Ozawa.153 
In return, Ozawa requested from the Prime Minister the passage of the International Peace 
Cooperation Bill.  
In his general policy, following the inauguration of his government 
Miyazawa declared that the passage of the UN peace cooperation law as one of his policy 
priorities.154 On November 18, the draft bill was submitted to the Lower House for 
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deliberations. Again one of the major points of contention between the DSP on one hand 
and the government, LDP and Komeitō on the other was the Diet approval. DSP insisted 
on prior Diet approval but Prime Minister Miyazawa argued that with the inclusion of the 
five conditions into the Law a sufficient level of civilian control was ensured. Even 
though the Komeito members’ votes were sufficient for passing the Law at the Lower 
House, nevertheless the government did not want to antagonize the DSP as this could 
have led the DSP to move towards the JSP and the Rengō no Kai group which were much 
more powerful in the Upper House and had a united stance in opposing the government 
sponsored bill.  
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the LDP lost the by-
elections in Nara and Migai prefectures to Rengō no Kai which fought the election by 
opposing the PKO bill. The government and Komeito tried to negotiate with the DSP by 
offering Diet approval within two years after a dispatch was made. The DSP insisted for 
six months. However, without reaching a consensus with DSP, the government called for 
a voting at the special committee where the bill was discussed. Even though there were 
sufficient votes to pass the bill, the opposition parties resorted to physical force to block 
the voting. Komeito cooperated with the LDP in railroading the bill at the special 
committee in the House of Representatives but did not show support during the voting at 
the plenary session due to the criticism the party leaders received from their supporters. 
The DSP, however, was excluded from that process. 
The JSP and the JCP were strongly against passing the bill. The JSP chairman 
Makoto Tanabe requested the withdrawal of the bill from Prime Minister Miyazawa 
which he rejected. During the deliberations in the special committee, the JSP members 
tried to slow down the deliberations. They requested the release of UN internal documents 
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related to the use of force which Japan’s MOFA acquired. It was made public by Yomiuri 
newspaper that these documents suggested that the military personnel were allowed to 
use force in cases where there was a forceful attempt to disarm them or a forceful entry 
into their area of operation. This exceeded the Japanese government’s official view which 
only allowed the use of weapons for self-defense and the defense of their fellow SDF 
members. Besides using delaying tactics, the JSP submitted their counter-bill both to the 
Lower and Upper houses.  
The counter-bill emphasized the principles of non-military, civilian and 
civilian control over the military (higunji, minsei, bunmin) and proposed the 
establishment of a separate organization composed of volunteers and excluded SDF 
members. After the forceful passage of the bill in the special committee the JSP and JCP 
threatened the government with censure motions and snail walk (or ox walk) had the bill 
sent to the plenary session. Consequently, due to the opposition parties’ pressures Prime 
Minister sent the bill back to the special committee of the Lower House. The bill finally 
passed the Lower House on December 3 with a minor modification of incorporation of 
Diet approval for the SDF’s overseas activities exceeding two years.155 The same day the 
bill was sent to the Upper House.156  
However, the government decided to delay the discussions on the bill to the 
next ordinary session of the Diet as the two opposition parties the JSP and JCP did not 
agree on to extent the extraordinary Diet session for more than ten days. JSP put forward 
four conditions before agreeing on initiating the deliberations in the Upper House: 
clarifying the date when the supplementary government budget proposal would be 
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submitted to the Diet; at least twenty days of deliberations on the PKO draft bill in the 
Upper House; A promise from the LDP for not railroading the bill in the Upper House; 
and finally an explanation on the consistency of the PKO draft bill and the 1954 Diet 
resolution that banned the overseas dispatch of the SDF.157 In relation to the fourth 
condition, Miyazawa provided the explanation that when the SDF was created in 1954, 
the government did not assume dispatching troops for UN PKOs therefore that resolution 
did not cause a problem. He further argued that what was banned in the Constitution was 
the overseas troop deployments with the purpose of use of force not troop dispatches for 
UN PKOs.158  The extraordinary session of the Diet was extended for ten days only and 
as a result the deliberations were delayed to the next ordinary session which was 
scheduled to start on January 24, next year. According to one article published in the 
Yomiuri newspaper, the Miyazawa administration bowed to the opposition in exchange 
for them not calling on witnesses to the Diet to testify on Prime Minister Miyazawa’s 
involvement in the recruit scandal.159 Against these developments Ozawa and other LDP 
members severely criticized Miyazawa for his leadership skills and for the fall out with 
the DSP but nevertheless did not withdraw the Takeshita faction’s support for Miyazawa.   
The next ordinary session of the Diet was scheduled to end by mid-June 1992. 
Now the government had to convince the opposition parties. First and foremost the 
Miyazawa administration had to settle an agreement between the Komeito and DSP. 
DSP’s support was important because if the DSP aligned itself with the JSP a more 
powerful opposition would be created against the LDP in the Upper House. The DSP and 
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JSP had common points both were non-communist left wing parties which depended on 
the support of the Rengo-kai (Japan Trade Union Confederation). Second, it had to 
negotiate with the JSP which was the most powerful party in the Upper House. Moreover, 
it was the last chance for the government and the LDP to pass the bill because according 
to the rules of the Upper House if a bill was not decided prior to an Upper House election 
then it would be automatically scrapped as the half of the members of the House would 
be elected. The Upper House elections were going to be held in July. The government and 
the ruling LDP had to come up with a deal that was acceptable at least to the Komeito and 
DSP to attain a simple majority needed to pass the bill in the Lower House. In order to 
negotiate with the opposition parties the government decided to make side payments. First 
side-payment was political reform which was about addressing corruption in political 
fund-raising, the redistribution of the Lower House Diet seats and election reform. The 
second one was the early approval of the fiscal 1992 budget which included a cut on 
defense spending.  
The opposition parties including the JSP, DSP, Shaminren and Komeito 
agreed on the defense budget cuts. In exchange for these, the government got the 
opposition parties to accept a reconsideration of the draft bill. At that point, an agreement 
between the ruling LDP and the opposition was made on revising the draft bill. 160 
However, how to revise that bill was not yet decided. In return Miyazawa accepted the 
opposition’s requests for reductions in the defense expenditure.161 The JSP continued to 
emphasize its motto on Japan’s international contribution “non-military, civilian areas 
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(public welfare), and civilian control over the military,”162 and went on to press the 
government to discard the bill. By early February, The Komeito Secretary General Yūichi 
Ichikawa proposed a plan which included imposing a freeze on Japan’s participation in 
peacekeeping forces. An additional law would be necessary to lift the freeze. The SDF 
would be allowed to engage in monitoring ceasefires, transportation and medical 
activities. Second, the Komeito proposed to compromise with DSP on the adoption of 
Diet approval within six months after a dispatch.163 
The views within the LDP with respect to the SDF’s overseas roles and the 
fate of the draft bill was diverse. Three viewpoints stood out. First, was to discard the bill. 
This group later argued that instead of a permanent UN PKO law, a special law with a 
limited time period should be created for the PKO in Cambodia. Second was to revise the 
bill in a way to limit the SDF’s participation to election monitoring only and exclude full 
participation. Third view was accepting full participation including the UN-led missions 
that involved the use of force by changing the interpretation of the Article 9. This third 
view was pioneered by Ozawa. Following the Gulf crisis, based on the then Prime 
Minister Kaifu’s request for advice a special research commission on the role of Japan in 
the international Community was formed under Ozawa’s leadership in June 1991. The 
commission is also known as the Ozawa Commission. The Commission met twenty-one 
times since then and its final report was finished by February 1992. Ozawa talked about 
the views presented in the draft report to Yomiuri Shimbun. He not only clearly made a 
distinction between collective self-defense and collective security but also suggested that 
the use of force for the purpose of collective security was constitutional. A part of his 
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interview was as follows:  
 
Indeed, for Japan to play a more active role from any other country 
in peace keeping organizations centered on the United Nations, 
which every country in the world today is a member of, is the aim 
of the Constitution. I think we should use every possible means to 
make this our ideology.  
About problems related to the Article 9, in my opinion, the 
Constitution is not an obstacle for our country to fulfill its UN-
centered roles in the international society. [Participating in UN-
centered peacekeeping organizations] suits the aims of the 
Constitution.   
As the Ozawa Commission, basically if Japan must fulfill its roles 
in the international society based on the objectives and principles 
of international peace, peace state, pacifism which are the 
objectives of Constitution, then maintaining international peace and 
order becomes the ultimate aim. In order to maintain peace, of 
course many things can be done such as improving public welfare 
and technical cooperation; however, the act of using force to 
suppress the people who want to destroy those things by force 
should not be distinguished from cooperation in public welfare and 
such.  
Not only the narrow-scoped PKOs [Peacekeeping operations] but 
also if we consider the fact that the United Nations is functioning 
for the world peace and if an army is established by the UN for the 
maintenance of order Japan should participate in that. Namely, if a 
UN reserve army is established participating in that army does not 
contradict [the Constitution].   
… 
The arguments related to the so-called collective self-defense and 
collective security are being examined. Moreover, we made the 
problem of one-sided nature of the US-Japan Security Treaty— this 
is also connected to collective self-defense and many arguments 
appeared about that — a future task to be examined.  
Collective security receives support and understanding from many 
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people both internationally and internally. However, it is 
inconvenient that the words collective self-defense and collective 
security resemble each other. Since we clearly separate these two 
concepts I decided that I will not say collective security but use the 
word international security. 164  
 
Ozawa Commission’s final report was submitted to the party members in the 
LDP general meeting on February 20. The report suggested to change the official state 
interpretation of the Constitution so as to allow the SDF members’ participation in a 
United Nations reserve force besides full participation in UN peacekeeping forces. The 
report pointed out that the international order was not transparent and regional conflicts 
based on ethnic and religious antagonisms might be more frequently observed. In that 
context greater burden sharing is demanded from Japan for the purpose of maintaining 
world peace, order and economic prosperity. The report criticized Japan’s conventional 
stance as “one country pacifism” and mentioned that “peace is not equal to anti-
militarism.” The report called for greater international cooperation based on the principle 
of “positive and active pacifism.”165  
Ozawa commission was not the only actor pushing for change in the common 
understandings of the politicians and the Japanese society. This idea was also supported 
by major opinion leaders in Japan (scholars, journalists, and international civil servants) 
and constantly communicated to the public via symposiums, publications of private study 
groups in newspapers. An example was the private commission investigating the 
problems with the Constitution (Kenpō Mondai Chōsakai) sponsored by the Yomiuri 
                                                   
164 For members and the discussions during the first meeting of the Commission see: “Yomiuri Shimbun 
Kenpō Mondai Chōsakai Dai 2 kai Anzenhoshō wa Kokuren-jiku ni Kōken Ozawa Ichirō-shi no Kenkai 
Kiku,” Yomiuri Shimbun, February 13, 1992, 4.  
165 “Jieitai no Kokuren Sanka Kanō Kenpō Shinkaishaku wo Motomeru, Ozawa Jimin Tokubetsu 
Chōsakai ga Tōshin Genan Teiji,” Yomiuri Shimbun, February, 21, 1992, 1. 
78 
 
Shimbun. The commission members included many famous Japanese scholars. The 
Commission called for the re-interpretation of the Article 9 in light of Japan’s 
international responsibilities and Japan’s identity as an “international state” (koksai 
kokka).166 
Also, at the party level, the LDP produced its own publications about 
peacekeeping operations which were intended to inform the public. Also various foreign 
politicians and scholars were invited to Japan to inform the public about UN PKO 
operations and argue for the necessity of Japan’s participation. For example, after being 
appointed as the special envoy of the UN Secretary General to Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi 
called Japan to contribute to the PKO in Cambodia.167 Also, Cambodia’s Prime Minister 
of the Phnom Penh government, Hun Sen even visited Japan and met with the JSP 
chairman Makoto Tanabe and Komeito chairman Koshiro Ishida to convince the leaders 
on the necessity of Japan’s participation in PKO in Cambodia. Some sources suggested 
that the LDP leaders invited the Cambodian Prime Minister. 168 
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Miyazawa mentioned that the government will 
not change its official interpretation of the Article 9.169 Thus, the government opted for 
a limited participation went on with revising the bill according to the wishes of the minor 
opposition parties. However, while the Komeito insisted on a temporary freeze, the DSP 
rejected this idea on the grounds the SDF would not be able to properly contribute to 
PKOs and consequently Japan would lose the respect of the international society. Due to 
the deadlock between the Komeito and DSP, and in view of the upcoming by elections, 
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Prime Minister decided to prioritize the early passage of the 1992 Fiscal budget and 
political reform.170 On April 9, the fiscal 1992 budget passed the Diet171  
On April 12, a major breakthrough happened when the DSP Chairman Keigo 
Ouchi announced that his party was ready to accept Komeito’s proposal of temporary 
freeze provided that a prior Diet approval was inserted in the bill.172 In return, Komeito 
secretary general Ichikawa expressed his willingness to discuss the prior Diet approval 
issue. Finally, a consensus was reached between the LDP and the two opposition parties 
by late April on resuming the deliberations. Thus, after a four month break, the 
deliberations started in the special committee of the Upper House on April 28.  
What helped to overcome this stalemate between the two opposition parties? 
It was the ruling LDP members’ warnings to smaller opposition parties. The government 
threatened the opposition with dissolving the Upper House and holding simultaneous 
elections for both Houses which was considered more advantageous for the ruling party. 
In the past, simultaneous elections were held twice in Japan, in 1980 and in 1986. In both 
cases, the opposition bloc as a whole suffered significant loss of seats and LDP won a 
two-thirds majority.  
Hori’s research revealed that simultaneous elections are more advantageous 
for bigger parties than smaller ones. His analysis found that the increase in the voter 
turnout in the past two simultaneous elections was a factor behind LDP’s decisive victory 
in both elections. 173  LDP’s victory can be attributed to the fact that Lower House 
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elections determine the government and draw more voters than an election for the less 
powerful Upper House. Qualified voters may be less interested in an Upper House 
election and may choose not to vote. In contrast, as the Lower House election determines 
the government, more electors are expected to vote in a simultaneous election than in a 
single Upper House election. We can expect the voter turnout to be higher in simultaneous 
elections than a single Upper House election. Consequently, a simultaneous election 
would be less advantageous for smaller parties as it may undermine their overall strength 
in the Diet.  
The fact that a simultaneous election could be less advantageous for smaller 
parties had been proved in the past by the results of two simultaneous elections held in 
1980 and 1986. The first postwar simultaneous election was held in 22 June 1980. If the 
results of this election are compared to the results of the two previous elections for both 
Houses, then the declining strength of the smaller parties can be understood. The previous 
election for the Lower House was held in 1979. Table 2.4 compares the results of the 
number of seats obtained in the Lower House as a result of the elections held in 1979 and 
1980. While LDP seats increased from 248 in 1979 to 284 in 1980, Komeito’s seats 
declined from 57 to 33. DSP also lost 3 seats and JCP lost 10 seats174  
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Table 2.4. Number of Seats won across Political Groups in the Lower House 
Elections of 1979 and 1980 
 
Political Group 1979 election 1980 election 
Liberal Democratic Party 248 284 
Japan Socialist Party 107 107 
Komeito  57 33 
Democratic Socialist Party 35 32 
Japan Communist Party 39 29 
New Liberal Club 4 12 
Social Democratic Federation 2 3 
Independents 19 4 
   
(Source: Interparliamentary Union) 
 
The 1986 simultaneous election repeated this pattern even though the decline 
of seats for smaller parties were fewer than in 1980. The Table 2.5 compares the results 
of the 1986 election to that of 1983. The LDP increased its seats by 50, while the 
opposition parties lost seats. The JSP lost 27 seats, Komeito lost 2 and DSP lost 12.175 
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Table 2.5. Comparison of the Number of Seats won across Political Groups in 
the Lower House Elections of 1983 and 1986. 
 
Political Group 1983 election 1986 election   
Liberal Democratic Party 250 300 
Japan Socialist Party 112 85 
Komeito  58 56 
Democratic Socialist Party 38 26 
Japan Communist Party 26 26 
New Liberal Club 8 6 
United Social Democratic Party 3 4 
Independents 16 7 
 
(Source: Interparliamentary Union)  
The Miyazawa Cabinet’s threats of holding simultaneous elections worked 
as catalyst in the negotiations between the DSP and Komeito. The DSP and Komeito 
leaders started to think that they had to reach on a consensus and help pass the bill in the 
current Diet session. Holding simultaneous elections could be detrimental to the survival 
of small parties. Thus, the side payment made by the Miyazawa Cabinet was not holding 
simultaneous elections in return for both parties’ support for the passage of the bill.  
The opposition parties were very wary of the progress in negotiations 
between the Komeito and the DSP and to be excluded from the discussions on 
amendments to the bill. JSP was being criticized for the lack of its capacity to propose an 
alternative policy to the government sponsored bill. As a result, the party submitted its 
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counter-bill to the Upper House. The bill suggested the dispatch of personnel to UN 
peacekeeping activities excluding military ones and to disaster relief operations. Also, the 
bill banned the participation of the SDF members. The bill also required prior Diet 
approval of the basic plans of the dispatches decided by the Cabinet.176  
By mid-May, the Komeito and DSP reached a consensus on the concrete 
amendments to be made. Komeito also specified the activities on which a temporary 
freeze would be imposed. These activities were monitoring disarmament, stationing at 
and patrolling of areas for preventing the recurrence of conflict. Inspecting the export and 
import of weapons, collecting, administering and disposing of abandoned weapons, 
assisting the establishment of ceasefire zones, assisting the exchange of captives and 
prisoners of war between conflicting parties. These activities would be on temporary 
freeze until a new law was enacted to lift the freeze.177 On May 21, both Komeito and 
DSP agreed on the insertion of both prior Diet approval and the temporary into the draft 
bill. 178  
On May 25 finally the parties agreed on expanding the areas on which both 
the freeze and the prior Diet approval would be applied. Two additional activities would 
be put on freeze. These were transportation of weapons and ammunitions and observation 
of ceasefires. The prior Diet approval was expanded to all areas of operations. The basic 
plan of mission decided by the Cabinet would be subject to prior Diet approval in line 
with the demands of the Rengo Sangiin. Another condition that was the review of the law 
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after three years was also inserted in the draft bill.179 
On June 1, the revised UN PKO bill was jointly submitted by the LDP, 
Komeito and DSP to the special committee of the Upper House.180 The JSP and JCP 
threatened to use physical force and engage in delaying tactics such as the “ox-walk” and 
submitting censure motions against the members of the Miyazawa Cabinet to block a 
voting on the bill. Despite the obstructive efforts of the JSP and JCP, the bill passed the 
Upper House on and sent back once again to the Lower House for another voting as it 
underwent revisions in the Upper House. The bill was enacted on June 15, marking an 
end of 9 months long journey.  
6. Conclusion  
The Japanese government’s attempt to create a UN PKO Law which would 
allow the dispatch of the SDF members was a long journey with many hurdles. The Gulf 
War was starting point. During the Gulf Crisis, the LDP-led government drafted a bill that 
would enable the SDF and other civilian personnel to provide logistical support to the 
US-led military coalition stationed in the Middle East. However, due to the opposition 
parties, the bill had to be aborted before passing the Upper House. While the LDP held a 
majority in the Lower House (275/512), in the Upper House it was the opposition parties 
that held the majority which produced a divided legislature. As a result, the LDP could 
not pass the bill. However, under the leadership of Ichiro Ozawa a former LDP Secretary 
General the three parties (LDP, Komeito and DSP) agreed on to create a new draft bill.        
The government was able to convince the two opposition parties in two ways. First, by 
incorporating the views of the two opposition parties into the Law, and second by 
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threatening to hold early simultaneous elections. Thus, the government employed both 
normative persuasion and political threats to convince the opposition parties to cooperate 
with the government in enacting the bill. The employment of this dual strategy 
demonstrated that normative persuasion alone was insufficient to bring forth policy 
change.  
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Chapter 3 
Changes in the Domestic Political Power Distribution and Perspectives on State Identity  
(1993-2001) 
 
1. Introduction  
Before examining the situation in 2000s, the changes that occurred in the 
domestic political scene in the aftermath of 1992 should be explained, as they affected 
Japan’s policy on overseas troop dispatches in the 2000s. Two types of changes are 
explained here. The first is about the change in domestic distribution of power. Three 
major developments are relevant to understand this change, namely, the start of the LDP-
Komeito coalition, the decline of the JSP, and finally the rise of the DPJ as the major 
opposition party. All of these developments had a significant impact on the powers of 
actors involved in the legislative process and their relations with one another.  
The second type of change is normative which involves the actors’ (or 
political elite’s) views on state identity— namely, beliefs pertaining to the kind of roles 
Japan should play in the international realm. As many scholars have observed, this 
ideational change has been brought about by the severe international criticism of Japan’s 
response to the Gulf crisis and the following war. In particular, the political elite in Japan 
understood the wide gap between the international community’s expectations of Japan 
and the Japanese people’s views on the roles their country should play internationally. As 
a result, two distinct discourses on Japan’s state identity emerged — Japan as a “normal 
state” and Japan as a “global civilian power” and consolidates throughout the 1990s. 
These new identity conceptions were later used for legitimizing certain policy courses 
during the debates on how Japan should respond to the war on terror in Afghanistan (see 
87 
 
chapter 4). 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section describes the 
power-related changes in the domestic political scene. It mainly focuses on the parties’ 
strength in the Diet by examining election results and secondary sources. The second 
section focuses on changes in political elites’ views on state identity by referring to 
secondary sources, official party documents and opinion leaders’ writings. It will 
elaborate on the dominant discourses of state identity in Japan.   
 
2. Changes in the Domestic Political Distribution of Power   
Scholars of Japanese domestic politics described the 1990s as the “chaotic 
years” for political parties; for example, Hyde commented “throughout the 1990s, 
Japanese political parties were in a state of mayhem; many parties were created and 
dissolved and approximately 35 were in existence for such a brief period that they are 
now virtually forgotten.”181 Also, Schoppa contributed to the argument with “Japan’s 
party system in the period after 1993 was a picture of instability. Parties were splitting, 
forming, merging, and dissolving in such rapid succession that the game of musical chairs 
seemed to describe what was going on better than any known theory of political 
science.”182  
As both imply, it is not an easy task to explain all the events that transpired 
in detail as it was the most turbulent time in Japanese domestic politics. For the present 
analysis, however, three developments are particularly relevant for understanding the 
implications of power changes over security policy. These developments were the 
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formation of the LDP-Komeito coalition, the decline of the JSP, and finally the rise of 
DPJ as the biggest opposition party. These three developments had significant impact 
over the future direction of Japan’s contribution to international security and overseas 
troop deployments to international military operations.  
 
2.1. The Formation of the LDP-Komeito Coalition  
The explanation of one of the biggest changes that occurred in the 1990’s 
Japanese political scene begins with the formation of the coalition between the LDP and 
Komeito. How was the coalition formed and how did it affect foreign policy? The political 
jolts that took place between the collapse of the Miyazawa Cabinet (June 1993) and the 
rise of Prime Minister Koizumi (April 2001) revealed that the LDP was no longer able to 
maintain a majority in the Diet without a reliable coalition partner.   
The first incident that weakened the LDP was the large scale defections from 
the party. On 18 June 1993, the opposition parties submitted a no-confidence motion 
against Prime Minister Miyazawa to protest against his backtracking on his promise to 
implement electoral and political reform. A group of members within the LDP— mainly 
the Ozawa-Hata group— voted in favor of this motion alongside the opposition parties. 
As a response, Miyazawa dissolved the Lower House. On the same day of the vote against 
the prime minister, two groups defected from the LDP to establish their own independent 
parties. These were New Party Harbinger (Shinto Sakigake) established by Takemura 
Masayoshi and Japan Renewal Party (Shinseito) established by Ichiro Ozawa and 
Tsutomu Hata. A year earlier, another small party, Japan New Party (Nihon Shinto) had 
already been established by a former LDP member, Morihiro Hosokawa.  
A Lower House election was held on 18 July 1993 a month after the 
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dissolution of the House. As a result, eight small parties, including the above-mentioned 
three, formed the first non-LDP coalition government with Hosokawa as the Prime 
Minister. The result of the 1993 election is shown in the Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1. Results of 18 July 1993 Lower House Election 
 
Political Group Seats in the House 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 223 
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 70 
Japan Renewal Party (JRP)  55 
Komeito 51 
Japan New Party (JNP) 35 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 15 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 15 
New Party Harbinger 13 
United Socialist Democratic Party  4 
Independents 30 
 
(Source: Inter-parliamentary Union)183 
 
The parties were united by a common goal; to realize political and electoral 
reform. Many politicians believed that the LDP was able to stay in power for as long as 
fifty years only because of the electoral system. Thus, implementing political and 
electoral reform became a common goal for the parties. The coalition managed to pass 
the required legislation for reform but was dissolved in April 1994 soon after fulfilling its 
mission when internal disagreements over other policy areas surfaced. Two months later, 
a new coalition government was formed between the LDP, JSP and New Party Harbinger 
in June 1994 with a JSP member Tomiichi Murayama as the Prime Minister.184    
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Following the electoral reform, two elections, 1996 in the Lower House and 
1998 in the Upper House, revealed that the LDP could no longer maintain a majority in 
the Diet under the new system. In the 1996 Lower House election, the LDP clashed with 
Ozawa’s New Frontier Party (NFP: Shinshinto). Following the dissolution of the first non-
LDP coalition, in December 1994, NFP was established under the leadership of Ichiro 
Ozawa through the merger of Ozawa’s former Japan Renewal Party, Japan New Party, 
Komeito, DSP and other small groups that broke from the LDP and became the largest 
opposition party. According interviews with Oka, Ozawa’s aim was to form a party that 
was strong enough to displace the LDP. Ozawa had high hopes of winning the election, 
and finally hoped to reap the benefits of the electoral reform he had so carefully built.185 
However, contrary to Ozawa’s expectations, the party failed to defeat the LDP. Not only 
for Ozawa, was the election a failure for the LDP because the results proved that the LDP 
could not attain the majority required to pass laws. The party won only 239 seats of 500. 
The results of the election are shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2. Results of 20 October 1996 Lower House Election 
 
Political Group  Total Seats in the House 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 239 
New Frontier Party (NFP) 156 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 52 
Japan Communist Party (JCP) 26 
Social Democratic Party (SDPJ) 15 
New Party Sakigake (NPS) 2 
Democratic Reform Party  1 
Independents  9 
 
                                                   
 
185 Oka, Policy Entrepreneurship and Elections in Japan: 86-87. 
91 
 
(Source: Inter-parliamentary Union)186  
The results of the election showed that the LDP needed a reliable coalition 
partner. Shinoda indicated that the LDP executives initially wanted to maintain the old 
coalition with JSP and New Party Harbinger. However, the two parties declined the offer 
of coalition but promised to cooperate with LDP in passing laws if a majority was needed 
in the Diet. Shinoda surmised that the reason why these two parties rejected a formal 
coalition with the LDP was probably their fear of alienating their supporters. The LDP 
formed the government without a coalition partner, under Ryutaro Hashimoto as the 
Prime Minister.187 Had the party formed a coalition with the SDPJ and the New Party 
Harbinger, they would have held 256 seats barely a majority sufficient to pass a law but 
still insufficient to override an Upper House rejection. As previously mentioned, 
overriding an Upper House rejection requires a two-thirds majority of the members 
present in the Lower House. Consequently, the results of the next Upper House election 
would be crucial in determining the fate of the LDP-led government.  
On the opposition front, shortly after its defeat in the Lower House election, 
Ozawa’s New Frontier Party dissolved in December 1997. Soon after the dissolution, in 
January 1998, Ozawa once again formed a new party, this time the Liberal Party (Jiyuto). 
Four groups from the New Frontier Party joined the newly established DPJ. The Komeito 
group was briefly divided into two groups but soon they united and reestablished an 
independent political party under the name of New Komeito in 1998. Hereafter, New 
Komeito will be referred as simply Komeito to follow the established usage in English.  
The results of the 1998 Upper House election was interpreted as a huge failure by 
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the LDP and Prime Minister Hashimoto resigned in response.  
The episode proved that the party would not be able to maintain a majority 
in the Diet, and that it a needed a reliable coalition partner in order to pass legislation. 
LDP itself lost 5 seats. The seats of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ, the JSP 
change its name in 1998) dropped from 38 to 14 and New Party Harbinger had only 3 
seats. This meant that even if the LDP formed a coalition with the SDPJ and New Party 
Harbinger, they would have only 122 seats— four seats short of a bare majority.188 As 
the LDP did not have two thirds majority in the Lower House, it would be too small to 
override an Upper House decision. The results of the election are shown in Table 3.3. 
Thus, the LDP needed a stable and reliable coalition partner for the smooth passage of 
legislation. That partner would ultimately be Komeito.  
 
Table 3.3. Distribution of Seats by Political Group Following the 12 July 1998 Upper 
House Election  
 
Political Group Seats in the House 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 105 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 54 
Komeito 24 
Japan Communist Party (JCP) 23 
Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) 14 
Liberal Party 12 
Niin Club- Liberal Leagues 4 
New Party Harbinger  3 
Reformers' Network Party 3 
Independents 10 
 
(Source: Inter-parliamentary Union) 
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Following the resignation of Prime Minister Hashimoto, the LDP elected 
Keizo Obuchi. Obuchi’s first task was to establish a new coalition government. In search 
of a partner, Obuchi first approached Ozawa’s Liberal Party. According to a number of 
observers, LDP’s real “target” was Komeito; however, they believed that Komeito would 
not join alone unless another party was in.189  
The coalition talks between Ozawa’s Liberal Party and LDP officially began 
with the meeting held on 19 November 1998, at which both parties signed an agreement190 
For the LDP, Prime Minister Obuchi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka and LDP Secretary 
General Yoshiro Mori led the talks. According to Oka’s interviews, in that meeting, as a 
condition for joining the coalition, Ozawa asked LDP executives to accept his party’s 
proposals in various policy areas from taxation to national security policy.191  
The first of these condition was to abolish the system by which the ministers 
spoke at Diet sessions on behalf of their ministries. The second was a reduction in the 
number of cabinet ministers and civil servants over the next few years. The third was to 
reduce 50 seats in each house of the Diet.192 This condition required revising the Public 
Offices Election Law. In the Lower House the reduction proposed in the seats elected by 
proportional representation. The fourth condition was on tax policy which included the 
usage of consumption tax revenue for public welfare programs. Finally, in matters of 
security, Ozawa asked for the removal of the freeze imposed on the SDF’s activities in 
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UN PKO Law thereby authorizing SDF’s full participation in UN PKOs and other 
multinational military operations that were based on UN resolutions. In response, in the 
talks on 19 November Prime Minister Obuchi maintained that his government would only 
allow SDF’s participation in activities that did not involve the use of force, and Ozawa 
accepted this position.193  
Later, by January of the following year, soon after establishing the coalition 
government, the two parties reached an agreement with respect to security issues. The 
discussion involved the roles of SDF members in the context of multinational military 
operations and in US-Japan defense cooperation. Based on the agreement, first, the SDF 
could provide logistical support to multinational forces with a UN resolution; however, 
such support could not be directly linked to the use of force.194 Thus, Ozawa had to back 
down on full-participation. After reaching an agreement on major policy issues, the 
coalition government was formally established on 14 January 1999, where a member of 
the Liberal Party, Takeshi Noda, was given a post in the cabinet as the Minister of Home 
Affairs.  
The two party coalition was still 10 seats short of a majority in the Upper 
House and in the Lower House they did not hold the two-thirds majority required to 
override an Upper House rejection. They needed Komeito’s votes to pass legislation. The 
first issue on which the coalition government and the Komeito cooperated involved the 
enactment of three bills required for the implementation of the revised US-Japan Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines. Fouse summarized the content of the bills in the following way:  
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(1) a bill to ensure safety in situations surrounding Japan, which 
defines the kind of rear-area support offered to be offered to US 
forces;  
(2) a bill to revise the Self Defense Force (SDF) Law so that, in 
rescuing Japanese nationals abroad, it would be possible to use 
SDF transport ships and destroyers in addition to transport 
planes, which are permitted now; and 
(3) a bill to revise the ACSA [Acquisition and Cross-Servicing 
Agreement] to enable Japan to provide logistical support for 
contingencies in “areas surrounding Japan that have an 
important influence on Japan’s peace and security.” 195 
 
The most controversial one was the first bill specifying the conditions for, 
and the extent of the SDF’s logistical support for US forces in emergencies near Japan. 
The government had submitted the bills to the Diet on 28 April 1998 and since then they 
had been pending. The LDP and the Liberal Party had already reached an agreement on 
the content of the bill in January196. Only with Komeito’s support could the bill be passed.  
The content of the bill was significantly changed in accordance with 
Komeito’s policy preferences in the following way. First, the requirement of prior Diet 
approval for all types of logistical support activities, search and rescue operations was 
inserted into the law, while ex-post facto approval was only allowed in cases of 
emergencies. Second, a statement that the SDF’s activities would be allowed only if they 
“contribute to the effective implementation of the Japan-US Security Treaty.”197 Third, 
the definition of “emergencies surrounding Japan” was clarified. In this respect both the 
Komeito and other opposition parties as well as Liberal Party members demanded a 
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change in draft bill’s original statement which was “situations that could seriously affect 
Japan’s peace and security.” This statement was replaced with “situations that could 
develop into a direct attack on the country if no countermeasures were taken.” Komeito 
members also urged the government to come up with concrete possible scenarios of 
emergency situations.198 Finally, in accordance with Komeito’s request, conducting ship 
inspections was removed from the SDF’s duties. Initially, the Liberal Party had argued 
that the SDF could conduct ship inspections and use weapons if necessary as long as such 
inspections were based on a UN Resolution. However, during the Upper House 
deliberations Otohiko Endo of Komeito argued that, “to fire a warning shot on a vessel 
sailing on the open seas would contradict the spirit of the Constitution.” The LDP made 
significant concessions to Komeito by changing the bill in accordance with Komeito’s 
policy preferences,  
The guideline related bills passed through the Diet on 25 May 1999 and by 
late June both Komeito and LDP leaders announced that they would soon start the formal 
talks to add Komeito to the coalition. As soon as the talks started the major point of 
contention between the parties was neither security nor economic policy but electoral 
reform, a crucial issue for the political parties’ survival. Komeito members were strongly 
opposed to the Liberal Party’s proposal to reduce the number of Lower House seats 
elected by proportional representation. This was the part of the electoral reform policy 
agreement made by the LDP and Liberal Party earlier as part of the coalition deal. 
Komieto members and policy analysts believed that such a decision would be detrimental 
to Komeito’s survival as most of its members had been elected by proportional 
representation. Komeito president Takenori Kanzaki told Obuchi that the party would not 
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join the coalition if the bill to reduce the seats were passed in the Diet.199    
On the other hand the Liberal Party executives were pressuring the LDP to 
enact the electoral reform bill. The Liberal Party Secretary General, Hirohisa Fuji, 
mentioned the following in one of his interviews with the press:  
 
The LDP and Jiyuto [Liberal Party] jointly submitted a bill [to 
reduce the seats], but the bill has not yet passed into law. The 
passage of proposed legislation on cutting the 50 seats in the House 
of Representatives chosen by proportional representation, which 
had been agreed upon with the LDP, should be assured before the 
proposed formation of a tripartite alliance goes ahead.200  
 
Also, Ozawa threatened to leave the coalition a number of times unless the bill 
was voted in the Diet.201 
By late August the parties reached partial agreement when Komeito proposed 
a 30 seat reduction in the 300 single-constituency seats and a 20 seat reduction in the 200 
proportional representation seats.202 The Liberal Party accepted.203The tri-party coalition 
was formally established on 5 October, 1999 following LDP presidential elections. The 
three parties reached an agreement on various policy issues. In the security field, they 
agreed to enact a law that would authorize the SDF to cooperate with multinational forces 
based on a UN resolution, to lift the freeze imposed on SDF’s activities in the UN PKO 
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law, to revise the national defense policy and to enact contingency laws in response to an 
armed attack204 Under the Obuchi Cabinet, Kunihiro Tsuzuki of Komeito was appointed 
to the post of Director General of Coordination Agency.205  
The formal coalition talks between LDP, Liberal Party and Komeito lasted for 
three months and the focal point of negotiations was not foreign or economic policy but 
electoral reform which was crucial to Komeito’s political survival. The electoral reform 
bill which involved a cut in the Lower House seats was passed into a law in February 
2000. It reduced the number of proportional representation seats from 200 to 180.206 By 
entering the coalition, Komeito managed to limit the reduction of seats, to obtain a post 
in the Cabinet, and to incorporate the party’s views in various policies. In return, Komeito 
made significant concessions on security policy by agreeing to lift the freeze on SDF’s 
activities which was initially inserted in the UN PKO law by the party itself. The party 
was forced to make these concessions in its policy preferences on overseas troop 
dispatches to ensure its political survival.  
The Liberal Party’s presence in the tri-party coalition was short-lived, as 
approximately six months after the coalition’s inception, Ozawa and his followers in the 
Liberal Party left the coalition. Ozawa had been vocal about his party’s disappointment 
in the lack of progress implementing these reforms that were part of the coalition deal 
between the LDP and Liberal Party. Furthermore, Ozawa had been negotiating to form a 
new party by way of merging his party and the LDP prior to the elections. When Prime 
Minister Obuchi declined, Ozawa and his group left, while a small group of Liberal Party 
defectors established the Conservative Party (Hoshuto) led by Takeshi Noda and they 
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replaced the Liberal Party in the coalition.207 With Keizo Obuchi’s sudden hospitalization 
on 5 May, 2000, Yoshiro Mori was elected as the Prime Minister by the Diet and formed 
a new coalition government with three parties, the LDP- Komeito and the Conservative 
Party.  
The 25 June Lower House election once again proved the importance of 
Komeito to the LDP. The LDP could not secure a majority on its own. Of 480 seats, the 
LDP won only 233, 7 seats short of an absolute majority. Komeito won 31 and the 
Conservative Party 7. The distribution of seats are indicated in Table 3.4. The tripartite 
coalition was maintained in the second Mori Cabinet in which both junior partners got a 
single post. Chikage Ogi of the Conservative Party was appointed as the Construction 
Minister and National Land Agency Director, and Kunihiro Tsuzuki of Komeito 
continued his post as the Director General of the Coordination Agency. Later, in 
December 2000, during the reorganization of government offices and ministries, the 
Ministries of Health and Welfare were merged and Chikara Sakaguchi from Komeito 
became the first Minister of Labor and Welfare.208 This was a major achievement for 
Komeito as welfare and labor were the most important policy issues for the party.  
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Table 3.4. Distribution of Seats as a Result of 25 June 2000 Lower House Election 
 
Political Group  Number of Seats  
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 233 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 127 
Komeito 31 
Liberal Party 22 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 20 
Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) 19 
Conservative Party 7 
Mushozoku-no-kai 5 
Liberal League 1 
Others 15 
 
(Source: Inter-parliamentary Union)209 
 
The Mori Cabinet did not last long, as Mori himself proved to be an unpopular 
Prime Minister due to his political gaffes, but the incident that led to his resignation was 
his response to the collision of a US submarine and a Japanese fishing vessel that resulted 
in the death of nine Japanese citizens. The fact that he continued to play golf after hearing 
about the incident ruined his reputation in the public eye. His cabinet’s approval ratings 
dropped significantly. Under LDP pressure, Mori to resigned on March 10.  
On 26April, 2001, one of the most popular post-war prime ministers of Japan, 
Junichiro Koizumi came into power, namely, Koizumi Junichiro. He was hoping to 
become the man who changed the course of Japan’s policy on overseas troop deployments. 
Had the LDP been in power alone in a majoritarian government, he would have made 
drastic changes. Koizumi wanted to reform Japan in many ways. Even though, 
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privatization of the postal services topped his reform agenda, in the security field, he 
belonged to a group of Japanese politicians who wanted to strengthen the US-Japan 
alliance and revise the Article 9 of the Constitution so as to allow Japan to exercise its 
right of collective defense. However, the changes he made were modest compared to his 
ambitions. The major obstacle, as hinted at by the Japanese media was Komeito.  
Koizumi and the other coalition partners did not get off to a good start. During 
the LDP presidential election campaign, Koizumi suggested that he would form a 
coalition with the DPJ if he won. Needless to say, this annoyed Komeito and Conservative 
Party executives. The major point of contention between the LDP and the Komeito was 
the issue of collective self-defense rights. Koizumi strongly believed that Japan should be 
able to exercise its right to collective self-defense, a right that would allow Japan to 
contribute troops to international military operations to assist an ally under threat. The 
accepted state interpretation of that right, up to this point was that although Japan already 
had the right under international law as a sovereign state, Article 9 of the Constitution 
prevented the country to exercise that right. Koizumi believed that Article 9 should be 
revised to acknowledge the right, and his views were shared by other LDP members. In 
March 2001, LDP’s defense specialists issued a policy recommendation titled “Our 
Country’s Security Policy and the US-Japan Alliance.” The report stated the following:  
 
“Our current position on our country’s right to exercise collective 
self-defense has the potential to weaken the deterrence effect of the 
US-Japan alliance. We request to change the government 
interpretation and start investigating the establishment of a basic 
law on national security, and to clarify to what extent we can 
exercise our right to collective self-defense and participate in UN 
collective security initiatives.” 210 
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Moreover all four candidates running for the LDP presidency— namely, Shizuka Kamei, 
Ryutaro Hashimoto, Taro Aso and Junichiro Koizumi—proposed strengthening the US-
Japan alliance and Kamei explicitly declared that accepting Japan’s right to exercise 
collective self-defense was crucial for that purpose.211 Koizumi, in a television program 
on NHK, stated:  
 
It is impossible for Japan to do nothing if the United States forces 
are attacked while conducting joint activities with Japan on 
Japanese coastal waters in the high seas. If we regard the US-Japan 
alliance as our own national interest, then the public would 
understand even if we change the interpretation of the 
Constitution.212  
 
These views clashed with Komeito’s “pacifist” posture and the party executives 
indicated their opposition not only to Koizumi’s radical views on collective self-defense 
right, but also to education reform and Prime Minister’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Komeito 
leader Takenori Kanzaki urged Koizumi not to rush into constitutional revision. On 25 
April, the three parties reached an agreement on basic policy issues and decided to 
maintain the tri-party coalition.213 In the coalition agreement, Chikara Sakaguchi from 
Komeito retained his position as the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare.  
The coalition formation process was significant in two respects. First, it 
revealed that the actors could adjust their normative views on policy to enhance political 
power. By joining the coalition Komeito not only ensured its political survival but also 
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acquired a small share of power in the most important area to the party, welfare and labor. 
In return, Komeito agreed that the SDF members could cooperate with international 
military operations provided that they were based on a UN resolution. It also accepted 
legal changes necessary for the SDF to fully participate in UN PKOs. Finally, by joining 
the coalition, Komeito gained the power to influence future policies in accordance with 
its own policy preferences. In other words, Komeito emerged as “a major veto player” 
that could reject any proposal that was not in line with its own policy preferences by 
simply threatening to break from the coalition. As for the LDP, by entering into a coalition 
with Komeito, the party managed to attain the majority it lacked since the 1993 Lower 
House election. On the other hand, the cost of the coalition for the LDP was 
compromising to satisfy Komeito.  
What were the effects of this coalition formation process on the policy of 
overseas troop deployments? The major implication was that, even before the September 
11 incidents, the boundaries of the security policy including overseas troop deployments 
were already delineated by Komeito’s veto. The Komeito executives were clear about to 
what extent overseas troop dispatches were acceptable. Thus, an understanding was 
reached on the possibility of SDF’s provision of logistical support to multinational 
military forces if such a military act was based on a UN Resolution.  
 
2.2. The Decline of the JSP  
After the Gulf War, the JSP rapidly lost power as its presence in the Diet 
declined. The party’s seats number of seats dropped from 140 to 70 in the 1993 Lower 
House election, and then to 15 in 1996.214 In 2000, the party had only 19 seats in the 
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Lower House.215 The declining trend was also visible in the Upper House. Even though 
in the 1992 election the party managed to add 3 more seats and become 69, in the 
following elections the party’s presence in the Upper House sharply declined. In 1995, 
the total number of seats dropped to 38, in 1998 to 14, and finally in 2001 the party had 
only 8 seats.216 
Why did the party lose support? Hyde’s analysis of public opinion polls, 
suggests that the decline of JSP’s power was due to the loss of two different types of 
supporters. Firstly the “moderate supporters” withdrew their support as a result of JSP’s 
rigid stance during the Persian Gulf War. These supporters believed that the party’s policy 
of pacifism could not respond to the changes in the international realm in which Japan 
was expected to play a more active role. The second group of lost supporters were 
“hardline pacifists” who were dissatisfied with JSP leaders’ renouncement of traditional 
pacifist principles in exchange for political power.217 Looking back to 1994, when the 
JSP entered into a coalition with the LDP and New Party Harbinger, for the first time a 
Socialist Party leader Tomiichi Murayama became the Prime Minister. As a concession, 
the Prime Minister publicly declared that the party accepted the constitutionality of the 
SDF and recognized the necessity of the US-Japan Security Treaty.218 Hyde indicates 
that while this caused some people to stop supporting the party, Murayama cabinet’s 
achievements in obtaining a cabinet statement which apologized for Japan’s acts during 
the Second World War brought back some of its lost supporters. Nevertheless, she finds 
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that the party lost more supporters than it gained. As a consequence, the JSP, once the 
second biggest party in Japan, fell to a minor and insignificant opposition party by early 
2000s.219  
Miyashita also indicated that the public came to regard the party’s stance on 
security policy and Constitutional issues as “unrealistic.” For this reason, many of its 
supporters abandoned the party.220 In 2001, the party reverted back to its traditional 
pacifist stance by adopting a new guideline on security.221 Nevertheless, this could not 
save the party and it could not regain its former strength. Consequently, the biggest 
defender of pacifism in Japan was lost.  
   
2.3. The Rise of the DPJ as the Main Opposition Party   
While the JSP had gradually lost popularity and political power, a new party 
formed in the mid-1990s and became the largest opposition party by 2000. This, the last 
major development of the 1990s, was the emergence of the DPJ as the major opposition 
party to challenge the LDP. The DPJ was established by the formation of an anti-LDP 
alliance between conservative politicians and a group of socialists. Initially, the socialists 
constituted the majority in the party with 35 out of the party’s 57 Diet members; however, 
the presence of the socialists weakened as the party grew to include more and more 
Conservative politicians. In 1998, the DPJ grew further after absorbing four groups which 
left the New Frontier Party. One of these groups consisted of former DSP members.222              
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By 2000, the DPJ became the second major party in the Diet; however, its unity was often 
questioned by political analysts as intraparty divisions based on former party affiliations 
were already evident. Kollner indicated that by 2002 the party was already divided into 
five major factions. According to Kollner’s classification, there were five distinct groups:  
 
I. Yuai Kurabu consisted of former DSP members. 
II. Shinseikyoku Kondankai was the group of former JSP 
members.  
III. Kuni no Katachi Kenkyukai was a group defined by Kollner 
as “originating from citizen networks,” thus the members did not 
have any former affiliation. The group’s head was Naoto Kan.  
IV. Seiken Senryaku Kenkyukai consisted of former New 
Frontier Party members 
V. Kohokai mainly consisted of former New Party Harbinger 
members. 
 
In 2003, prior to the Lower House election, the DPJ was further strengthened 
when Ichiro Ozawa’s Liberal Party joined the DPJ. For Ozawa, joining the DPJ was a 
strategic choice to ensure political survival. Ozawa’s small Liberal Party’s prospects were 
no good in the upcoming Lower House election; however, as part of a bigger party, such 
as the DPJ, the Ozawa group had a greater chance of being part of the ruling party. 
Ultimately, this strategy produced the desired results, but not immediately, because the 
DPJ had to wait until 2009 to become the ruling party. Ozawa group’s participation 
strengthened the DPJ. Prior to the 2009 Lower House election the faction headed by 
Ozawa Isshinkai (Political Reform Group), was the largest faction within the party and 
thanks to the Ozawa group, the DPJ increased its power in the Diet. Between April 2006 
and May 2009, Ozawa served as the party president.223 
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Owing to its diverse structure, the DPJ has contained many different 
viewpoints and voices on policy since its inception. This was confirmed by scholars such 
as Schmidt who conducted an analysis of policy positions based on factional affiliation. 
Her analysis is illuminating in two respects. First, she found that factionalism within the 
DPJ was based on material interests rather than ideological differences. In other words, 
what separated DPJ members into different factions was the politicians’ material interests 
not normative beliefs. This finding supports the main argument made in this dissertation 
that material interests come before normative principles for politicians, and that 
normative principles can be modified to enhance material interests of actors. Schmidt’s 
second finding indicated that variance in policy positions was the greater within the DPJ 
than in other parties. Moreover, in security related issues the divergence of opinion was 
the greatest. The security related issues contained the revision of the constitution, the 
strengthening of defensive capacity, participation in UN’s peacekeeping operations, use 
of the right of collective self-defense, and a tough stance towards North Korea. Schmidt’s 
analysis found that constitutional revision, strengthening Japan’s defense capacity and 
support for collective self-defense were among the issues in which divergence among 
DPJ factions was the greatest.224 
Even if diversity in policy positions on security-related issues were far 
greater within the DPJ compared to any other political party, these differences were 
strategically pushed into the background or negotiated at times when the party had the 
opportunity to bring down the LDP. This was most visible when Ozawa group’s 
participated in the party. How Ozawa successfully used pacifist norms to oppose LDP 
policies will be explained in detail in the following chapter.  
                                                   
224 Ibid. 12-16.   
108 
 
 
3. Changes in the Actors’ Views on State Identity  
This section focuses on the changes in actors’ views on state identity. As a 
number of scholars have pointed out the end of the Gulf War led to a shift in political 
elite’s and wider public’s views on Japan’s role in the international society. The severe 
international criticism Japan faced vis-à-vis how the government responded to the crisis 
and the ensuing war have led to a “soul-searching” process on part of the political elite.225 
They understood the wide gap between their views on state identity and what was 
expected from them by the international society. The end result was the decline of 
pacifism or peace state identity which had been the traditional and most dominant 
conception of state identity until the end of the First Gulf War (1990-91).    
As many scholars of Japanese foreign policy have observed, in the post-Cold 
War period, two divergent views on Japan’s state identity have risen to a dominant status 
in the Japanese political discourse— Japan as “a normal state” (futsu no kuni) and Japan 
as “a global civilian power” (sekai minsei taikoku).226 Both groups’ starting point was a 
critique of Japan’s post-war “pacifist” posture which, according to them, have caused 
Japan’s inadequate response to the crisis and attracted severe criticism from the 
international society. The below section will discuss the contents of those two divergent 
views on Japan’s state identity and the kind of policy preferences they have posited.  
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3.1. Japan as a Normal State 
The idea that Japan should become a normal state was popularized by Ichiro 
Ozawa in the 1990s — a former LDP secretary general who later served as the President 
of Liberal party and then DPJ. During the creation of the International Peace Cooperation 
Law (1991-1992), he argued that the constitution allowed the SDF’s full participation in 
UN peacekeeping activities.227  
He later elaborated views on Japan’s international roles in his famous book 
Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, published in 1993. Ozawa argued 
that in order to become a true “international state” (kokusai kokka), Japan must first 
become a “normal state” which he defined as the one 
 
…that willingly shoulders responsibilities regarded as natural in the 
international community. It does not refuse such burdens on 
account of domestic political difficulties. Nor does it take action 
unwillingly as a result of “international pressure.”228 
 
…that it cooperates fully with other nations in their efforts to build 
prosperous and stable lives for their people.229  
 
Ozawa argued that this cooperation was considered necessary for Japan’s 
own survival and as a price to be paid as Japan had long benefitted from the international 
peace and stability and the free trade system created under the leadership of the United 
States during the Cold war.230 In the post-Cold war period, it was time for Japan to 
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contribute. Ozawa further argued that Japan’s international cooperation in the security 
field must be UN-centered, while maintaining its alliance with the United States. SDF’s 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations and working for the creation of a standing 
UN reserve force were considered two areas, to which Japan should contribute.231  
Ozawa maintained that the SDF’s participation in UN forces would not 
violate the constitution even if the SDF had entangled in a war since Article 9 prohibited 
the use of force “as a sovereign right of the nation” but the UN reserve forces deployment 
would be authorized by the Security Council and they would be under the command of 
the UN Secretary General not under the Japanese Prime Minister. 232  While an 
International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) was enacted in Japan (June 1992) to enable 
the SDF’s participation in non-combat peacekeeping activities, certain conditions 233 
were inserted in the law which Ozawa considered as “special treatment” for Japan, and 
by implication not normal.  
Even though Ozawa was the pioneer of the normalist discourse, today most 
scholars equate normalism in Japan with the willingness to use force in the context of 
U.S.-Japan alliance. In Ozawa’s views, SDF’s use of force as part of UN military force 
did not contravene Article 9. Also, Ozawa accepted the dominant state interpretation on 
Japan’s right to collective self-defense which suggested that Japan had the right like any 
other sovereign state under international law; however, its constitution prohibited the 
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implementation of that right.  
By the late 1990s, views with respect to re-examining the mainstream view 
on collective self-defense became more vocal, especially within the LDP.  For example, 
in January 2000 under LDP’s initiative, a commission to investigate the revision of the 
constitution (kenpō chōsakai) was re-established in the Diet. Moreover, by late 1990s the 
number of LDP parliament members who were in favor of revising Article 9 were much 
higher than that in any other party.234 Even prior to the September 2001 attacks, Prime 
Minister Koizumi personally expressed his view that Japan could undertake tasks in 
collective self-defense related arrangements as long as they were within the confines of 
the constitution. 235  His views did not particularly emphasize UN-centrism, whereas 
Ozawa’s views did. 
Today, politicians such as Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzō Abe and Tarō Asō are 
categorized as “U.S.-leaning normalists.”236 Their views diverge from Ozawa’s with 
respect to collective self-defense. While Ozawa accepts the constitutional limits on 
Japan’s right to exercise that right, the others believe that either the Constitution or the 
interpretation of Article 9 should be changed in a way that Japan could exercise that right 
in the context of U.S.-Japan alliance.237  
 
3.2. Japan as a Global Civilian Power 
The idea that Japan would become a “global civilian power” in the post-Cold 
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war period, together with Germany, was first introduced by a German political scientist, 
Hans W. Maull. He defined three characteristics of a “civilian power”:   
 
I. the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in 
the pursuit of international objectives; 
II. The concentration on non-military, primarily economic, 
means to secure national goals, with military power left as a 
residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of 
international interaction;  
III. A willingness to develop supranational structures to address 
critical issues of international management.238 
 
With respect to the third characteristic, Maull predicted that while Germany 
would embrace a strong regional identity in the course of European integration, for Japan 
the core institutional framework would be the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty instead of a 
regional one. Nevertheless, he mentioned that Japan would become the first “global 
civilian power” that would tackle “global challenges such as Third World development 
and environmental reconstruction.”239 
This idea that Japan should shape its foreign policy based on the civilian 
power identity was picked up and promoted by Japanese opinion leaders such as Yoichi 
Funabashi— a well-known Japanese journalist who served as a diplomatic correspondent 
in the United States and China and as editor-in-chief of the Asahi Newspaper. He played 
a key role in spreading this idea. In 1992, his article, which appeared in Foreign Affairs 
criticized Japan’s response to the Persian Gulf War. In the article, he stated that Japan was 
“an automatic teller machine— one that needed a kick before dispensing cash”240 He 
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further mentioned that Japan should create “a new image of itself in the world,” and 
become “the prototype of a global civilian power”241 which relies on economic means, 
not military, to achieve its foreign policy goals.  
Funabashi pointed out four areas in which Japan should pursue a more active 
foreign policy in line with that identity:  “to act as a model for, and lend assistance to, 
poorer countries in their own efforts for economic and democratic development; 
international peacekeeping; promotion of human rights; and environmental 
protection.”242 Moreover, Funabashi argued that this new image would be compatible 
with Japan’s post-war pacifist stance. Throughout the 1990s Funabashi published several 
articles and books promoting the “global civilian power” identity.243 Another prominent 
Japanese political scientist who had similar views with Funabashi was Yoshihide Soeya 
who argued that post-war Japanese diplomacy exhibited the characteristics of a middle-
power244 and human security has become Japan’s niche diplomacy.245  
Making civilian contributions to international security had been 
emphasized by Kōmeitō and the Social Democratic Party of Japan during the creation of 
the UN PKO Law (enacted in June 1992). During that process, the SDPJ’s motto was 
“higunji, minsei, bunmin,” which meant that Japan’s contribution should be guided by 
three principles: non-military, contribution in civilian areas and civilian control over the 
military. Kōmeitō has also been an ardent supporter of Japan’s non-military civilian 
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contribution to international security. Initially together with the SDPJ, the party was 
against the SDF’s overseas dispatches in the context of UN PKOs; however, with 
Kōmeitō’s inclusion in the creation process of the UN PKO draft bill, the party members 
accepted SDF’s participation as long as the missions they were involved in were non-
military. The party played the main role in inserting the above-mentioned “5 conditions” 
in the UN PKO law.   
However, a clear articulation of “global civilian power” as Japan’s state 
identity became increasingly salient in the political discourse by the end of the 1990s 
under the Obuchi administration. In 1999, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi summoned 
a private commission with the purpose of advising about Japan’s future trajectory. Among 
the members of the subcommittee responsible of the future of Japan’s foreign policy and 
its place in the world were Yoichi Funabashi and Yoshihide Soeya. In the final report that 
was submitted in January 2000, Japan’s identity as a “global civilian power” was 
acknowledged in the following way:  
 
Although it is not possible for a state to exist with absolutely no 
military elements, a country that does not give primacy to military 
affairs but conducts itself primarily through civilian activities, 
based on the principle of civilian control, is a civilian power. 246   
 
Furthermore, it was argued that a foreign policy based on this identity will 
serve Japan’s “enlightened national interest,” which was described as: 
 
…taking a long-term, indirect approach to satisfying a country’s 
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own needs by increasing the number of friendly countries and 
improving the international environment on the basis of “mutuality,” 
which also respects other countries’ interests. It is a way of 
benefiting both one’s own country and other countries by 
contributing to the international public good through maintaining 
and strengthening the international economic system and the 
international order and helping developing countries grow, as 
opposed to the rigid pursuit of national interest that forces both 
one’s own country and others constantly to make zero-sum, 
either/or choices.247  
 
The commission’s understanding of the civilian power was based on three 
dimensions: prioritizing non-military activities in foreign policy, pursuing cooperative 
relations with other states (multilateralism) especially in the context of United Nations 
and respecting the principle of civilian control over the military. Furthermore, in the report, 
the non-military areas, in which Japan must become active as a global civilian power, 
were specified as international peacekeeping, peacebuilding, reconstruction, protection 
of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and tackling with human security related global 
issues such as environmental protection, antipersonnel landmines, disaster management, 
refugees, health care, food security and poverty reduction.  
The three main characteristics of the global civilian power— non-military 
civilian contribution to international security, emphasis on multilateralism (or UN-
centrism), and enhancing civilian control over the SDF’s overseas dispatches—became 
the key features of DPJ’s general policy stance put forward in manifestos and official 
documents. For example, the party’s basic policies on security in 1999 proposed how 
Japan could use its economic resources to tackle regional conflicts.  
                                                   
247 Official Website of the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, “Chapter 6,” in The Frontier Within: 
Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium, 5, accessed November 26, 
2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/21century/report/htmls/. 
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The ethnic and religious-based conflicts that have become so 
marked in recent years are frequently rooted in economic 
difficulties. Japan’s diplomatic capacity which is backed by its 
economic power, needs to be further enhanced to contribute to the 
creation of peace.248  
 
The Basic Policy also mentioned the importance of civilian control DPJ’s 
general position that recognized the constitutional limitations on the exercise of collective 
self-defense right.249 
As mentioned earlier, the DPJ became the largest opposition party following 
its merger with the Ozawa-led Liberal Party in 2003. One of the consequences of this 
merger was that both the DPJ and Ozawa had to reconcile their views about the use of 
force. Two months after the merger, Ozawa reached an agreement with Yokomichi 
Takahiro who was the head of DPJ faction comprised of former Socialist Party members. 
They agreed on proposing the formation of a UN stand-by force (a reserved force spate 
from the SDF) as opposed to the LDP’s policy of establishing a permanent law that would 
allow the SDF to participate in multinational coalitions outside of the UN framework.250 
This was yet another adjustment to normative beliefs for political reasons. This time it 
was the Socialists who had to concede. 
Thereafter, DPJ’s election manifestos continued to emphasize autonomy 
and UN-centrism in foreign policy. For example, the 2004 manifesto emphasized DPJ’s 
UN-centrist stance in the following way:  
                                                   
248 Official website of the Democratic Party of Japan, “Democratic Party of Japan’s Basic Policies on 
Security (Provisional version),” (June 199), accessed, October 1, 2015. 
https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/security.html  
249 Ibid. 
250 “Yokomichi Ozawa Kaidan Anpo Ashinami wo Soroeru Minshutō Shikkōbu he Seisaku Ittaika 
Unagasu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 25, 2003, 4; “Minshu Kan Daihyō Kokuren Tokki Butai Teian he 
Jieitai to Betsu Soshiki,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 31, 2003, 2. 
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We will attach importance to international cooperation, and from 
that standpoint will participate vigorously in activities being 
undertaken by the United Nations...Japan will participate more 
positively in peace-building activities under UN auspices, and will 
study the specifics of the configuration of a possible UN standby 
force. 
 
With respect to the U.S.-Japan alliance the manifesto stated the following:  
 
As regards Japan-US relations we will do away with the dependent 
relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act 
in accordance with US wishes, replacing it with a mature alliance 
based on independence and equality. 
 
For example, the 2005 election manifesto of the DPJ which was critical of 
SDF’s deployment in Iraq stated the following:  
 
The Democratic Party of Japan will possess its own autonomous 
vision in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the 
international community, emphasizing the aim of "an enlightened 
national interest" when pursuing the national interest of Japan. We 
will take the lead in strengthening international organizations and 
in international cooperative efforts, taking the creation of trust with 
neighboring nations, rather than power politics, as a touchstone; 
and work toward becoming a nation that uses soft power to create 
peace together with the world.251 
 
4. Conclusion  
Since the end of the first Gulf War, the domestic political environment in 
Japan underwent a number of changes which would have significant impact over the 
country’s security policy and overseas troop contributions in the 2000s. Perhaps, the most 
                                                   
251 https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto5/manifesto5.html  
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important of those was the formation of the LDP and Komeito alliance which resulted out 
of necessity for both parties. On the LDP side, the major benefit was to attain the votes 
necessary to maintain a majority in the Diet. On Komeito’s side, with the alliance the 
party ensured its political survival by amending electoral reform law in favor of small 
parties like the Komeito. In the subsequent years of the coalition, the bonus for Komeito 
was to acquire the position to influence security, labor and welfare policy. Besides the 
coalition between the LDP and Komeito, another major development was the decline of 
JSP and the rise of DPJ as the main opposition party. The DPJ was an amalgam of various 
political groups with diverging views on policy and especially on security policy. The 
following chapter will show that the party managed to display a coherent and united view 
against the LDP when political interests dictated.  
The final change examined in this chapter was the domestic actors’ views on 
state identity or the kinds of roles Japan should fulfil in the international context. As the 
Japan received a severe criticism for its response to the Gulf War, the Japanese political 
elite have started to question the appropriateness of the existing notions on Japan’s state 
identity. With the Gulf War experience, they understood that the existing “peace state 
identity” and the policy choices entailed by this identity were not considered sufficient or 
appropriate by international standards. Consequently, new discourses on Japan’s state 
identity emerged. The most dominant ones were the “global civilian power” identity and 
the normal state identity. The former entailed UN internationalism and Japan to play a 
leading role in non-military global issues including full-participation in UN-led 
peacekeeping operations, global environmental and health problems, conflict resolution, 
and technological innovation. The normal state identity prioritized the consolidation of 
the US-Japan alliance and required Japan to be active in military areas for international 
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cooperation.    
The following chapter empirically demonstrates how actors, with the above 
mentioned power structure and divergent policy preferences, have competed for shaping 
Japan’s response to the U.S.-led “war on terror” in Afghanistan between the years 2001 
and 2010. It also demonstrates how actors adjusted their normative views in times when 
their political interests necessitated. 
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Chapter 4 
Japan’s Policy toward the “War on Terror” in Afghanistan (2001-2010): The Divided 
Legislature, Uncompromising Opposition and Deadlock 
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter examines Japan’s policy toward the U.S.-led military campaign 
in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. Under successive governments led by the LDP 
between 2001 and 2008, Japan supported the war in two ways: logistical support given to 
the U.S.-led military campaign by the SDF and economic assistance provided for 
reconstruction in Afghanistan. In July 2007, the LDP lost its majority status in the House 
of Councilors to the opposition parties led by the DPJ. This had an impact on the extension 
of the law that enabled the logistical support to the US-led military forces. The opposition 
parties led by the DPJ rejected the government’s proposals for a compromise and as a 
result the SDF’s mission was briefly suspended. Following the 2009 House of 
Representatives election, the new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
terminated the SDF’s mission while increasing reconstruction assistance, in spite of U.S. 
pressure on Japan to continue the SDF’s mission and higher costs involved with the 
additional economic assistance. As such, the chapter examines the factors behind such 
change. It considers the simultaneous effects of two distinct factors: contested state 
identity and the failure of government to persuade the main opposition under divided 
legislature.  
The chapter proceeds in the following way. First, the nature of Japan’s policy 
toward the U.S.-led “war on terror” in Afghanistan will be discussed. Second, this chapter 
will trace the policy-making process of Japan’s contribution to the “war on terror” in 
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Afghanistan between the years 2001 and 2010.   
 
2. Japan’s Policy toward the U.S.-led “War on Terror” in Afghanistan  
Japan adopted an eclectic policy toward the U.S.-led war on terror in 
Afghanistan by utilizing its SDF to provide logistical support to the U.S.-led military 
campaign  (2001-2010) and economic assistance for the reconstruction in Afghanistan 
(since 2002 to date)  
 
2.1.Logistical Support to the U.S.-led Military Coalition 
As a response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States 
launched a military campaign, the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 
2001 with the purpose of destroying the Al-Qaida stronghold in Afghanistan and 
overthrowing the Taliban regime which had refused to surrender the Al-Qaida leaders. At 
first, the coalition forces comprised of American and British troops but later other U.S.-
allies also contributed troops including France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Denmark. 
252 Under international law, the U.S.-led military intervention had its basis in Article 51 
of the UN Charter which recognizes UN member states’ right to use force in self-defence 
and collective self-defence in response to an armed attack.253 On September 12, the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1368 which 
recognized the United States’ right of individual and collective self-defence.254  The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members invoked the right of collective 
                                                   
252 J. Alexander Thier, “Afghanistan,” in Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations, ed. William J. Durch 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 476. 
253 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 51 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml 
254 United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1368, “Threats to international peace and security 
caused by terrorist attacks,” September 12, 2001, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm   
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defence for the first time since the organization’s inception to support the United States’ 
fight against terrorism in Afghanistan.   
In addition to the OEF, another military mission operating in Afghanistan 
was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Unlike the OEF, ISAF was a UN-
mandated multinational force in charge of maintaining peace and security in Afghanistan. 
The deployment of ISAF was authorized with United Nations (UN) Security Council 
Resolution 1386 passed on December 20, 2001. Later in August 2003, command of ISAF 
was transferred to NATO and its area of operation was expanded beyond Kabul.255 48 
countries including NATO and non-NATO members contributed troops to ISAF until 
2014. 256 Both ISAF’s and OEF’s mission ended in 2014 when the Afghan national 
forces took responsibility for the security of Afghanistan. Japan did not contribute any 
troops to ISAF. 
Under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) which was 
enacted on 1 November 2001, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces were allowed to provide 
logistical support for the U.S-led military campaign and to participate in rescue and relief 
operations for the military coalition’s wounded soldiers and Afghan refugees. The core of 
the SDF’s activities, however, became the refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean257 in 
the context of the OEF’s Maritime Interdiction Operation.  
As part of the OEF, the allied forces conducted a maritime interdiction 
operation in the Indian Ocean to cut terrorist groups’ access to Afghanistan on sea, supply 
                                                   
255 J. Alexander Thier, “Afghanistan,” in Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations, ed. William J. Durch 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 541-545. 
256 Official website of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures,” accessed October 9, 2015 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140903-ISAF-Placemat-
final.pdf  
257 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Chapter 1: The International Community and Japanese 
Diplomacy in 2001,” in Diplomatic Bluebook 2002, 12, accessed July 22, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap1-b.pdf, 19. 
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of weapons and drug trafficking which has been the major source of funds for Al-Qaida 
and the Taliban. The Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF) were stationed in 
the Indian Ocean to supply fuel and water to the naval vessels of the United States and its 
allies.258 
Originally, the ATSML had two years duration; however, it was extended 
three times—in 2003,259 2005 and 2006 and its basic implementation plan was revised 
several times with Cabinet decisions. After the law’s expiration in 2007, the SDF’s 
activities were briefly suspended until a new law with a similar content was passed in 
January 2008 in spite of the opposition in the Upper House. With the replacing law—the 
Act on Special Measures Concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support 
Activities— SDF’s refuelling activities were resumed. Later, this law was also extended 
for a year (until January 2010), again, overcoming the opposition in the Upper House of 
the Diet. In August 2009, when a new government was formed under the leadership of 
DPJ, the new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama declared that the refuelling mission would 
be ended following the expiration of the law in January 2010.   
According to the data provided by Japan’s Ministry of Defence, between 
2001 and 2007, Japan provided approximately 490 000 kilolitres of fuel and 6930 tons of 
water to 11 countries which costed approximately 61.2 billion yen. Under the law that 
replaced the ATSML, Japan provided 9500 kilolitres of fuel and 1440 tons of water to 7 
countries.260   
                                                   
258 Japan’s Ministry of Defense, “Japan is playing an Important Role in the International Community’s 
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259 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Chapter 3: Japan’s Foreign Policy in Major Diplomatic Fields,” 
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2.2. Economic assistance provided for the reconstruction in Afghanistan  
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Japan’s economic 
assistance for reconstruction in Afghanistan started with the Tokyo Conference in January 
2002, where Japan pledged 500 million U.S. dollars’ worth of assistance in non-military 
areas such as resettling refugees and internally displaced people, demining, education, 
health and medical care. Official Development Assistance (ODA) was used. The 
implementation of the assistance pledged during the first Tokyo Conference (January 
2002) was finished by February 2004. Japan pledged additional assistance around 400 
million U.S. dollars to be implemented until March 2006.261 In January 2006, at the 
London Conference on Afghanistan, Japan further extended US$450 million worth of 
assistance.262 
As of March 2013, Japan has implemented US$4.935 billion worth of post-
conflict reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan in six main sectors: (1) political process, 
(2) security sector, (3) infrastructure, (4) human resources development and humanitarian 
assistance, (5) agricultural development and (6) culture and higher education. Moreover, 
in the Tokyo Conference held on 8 July 2012, the government pledged up to US$3 billion 
of assistance to Afghanistan for the following five years, and declared that its assistance 
would continue even after 2017.263 Since 2006, to date, Japan ranks within the top five 
donors in bilateral assistance to Afghanistan, and, since 2011, Japan has become the 
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second largest donor following the United States.264  
 
3. The policy-making process behind Japan’s response to the U.S.-led 
“War on Terror” in Afghanistan (2001-2010) 
 
3.1.The Koizumi Cabinets (2001-2006)  
When Junichirō Koizumi was elected as the new president of the LDP, he 
became the Prime Minister of a three party coalition government comprised of the LDP, 
Kōmeitō and the Conservative Party (Hōshūtō). He was one of the most popular Prime 
Ministers in Japan with his Cabinet receiving an approval rate of 87 per cent.265 As 
Shinoda observed, Prime Minister Koizumi also had strong leadership skills and he made 
the Cabinet Secretariat the center organ responsible for policy coordination among 
various actors in the government. Shinoda argued that due his leadership skills the 
Cabinet swiftly passed the ATSML.266 On security and defense related issues, Prime 
Minister Koizumi mentioned numerous times his intention to discuss the revision of the 
Constitution or the possible situations in which Japan could exercise its collective self-
defense right. He also considered that Japan should exercise that right in the context of 
the US-Japan alliance. However; the New Komeito strictly opposed this idea and even 
threatened to break the coalition if Cabinet tried to realize the revision or changing the 
interpretation of the Article 9. 267  
                                                   
264 On Japan’s net ODA disbursements to Afghanistan and rankings among other donors see Ministry of 
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“Editorial/Speed up studies on Constitution,” Daily Yomiuri, June 24, 2001, 6.  
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Against this background, five months after Koizumi took office, the 
September 11 incidents happened which gave the Koizumi Cabinet an opportunity to 
make a decision on whether or not to send troops to the US-led multinational military 
force under formation. As mentioned above, Prime Minister Koizumi’s personal views 
were in favor of military roles for the SDF. The Conservative Party was known for its 
endorsement of exercising the collective defense right. Then, how did the pacifist 
Komeito was convinced for the dispatch of the SDF to provide logistical support for a 
US-led military operation, a response which it opposed a decade ago during the Persian 
Gulf Crisis. The government made two concessions to the support of Kōmeitō: material 
concessions in the form of a ministry in the LDP coalition and normative concessions by 
imposing limitations into the law.   
The material concessions were made with the continuation of the LDP-
Komeito and Conservative Party coalition which was formed during the Obuchi 
Administration. The three parties agreed to remain as partners and the Kōmeitō continued 
to occupy one cabinet post— Health, Labor and Welfare Minister.268 As to the normative 
concessions, the Komeito managed to impose a series of limitations on the Cabinet 
drafted bill that authorized troop dispatches which is explained below.  
After the September 11 attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi and the Cabinet 
Secretariat Fukuda Yasuo repeatedly mentioned that Japan would give ‘maximum support 
within the limits of its Constitution’, if the US decided to take military action. After these 
verbal assurances, Prime Minister Koizumi announced his government’s first official 
response on September 19. In this official statement, combating terrorism was regarded 
‘Japan’s own security issue’. The government’s official stance composed of seven 
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concrete measures. The seven-point action plan, which was formulated by the Cabinet 
Secretariat under the leadership of the Cabinet Director for Crisis Management, Kazuhiro 
Sugata, was as follows: 
 
I. The Government of Japan (GOJ) will promptly take the 
measures necessary to dispatch the SDF to provide support, 
including medical services, transportation and supply, to the US 
forces and others taking measures related to the terrorist attacks that 
have been recognised as a threat to the international peace and 
security in the UNSC Resolution 1368. 
II. The GOJ will promptly take the measures necessary to 
further strengthen the protection of facilities and areas of the US 
forces and important facilities in Japan. 
III. The GOJ will swiftly dispatch SDF vessels to gather 
information. 
IV. The GOJ will strengthen international cooperation, including 
information sharing, in areas such as immigration control. 
V. The GOJ will extend humanitarian, economic and other 
necessary assistance to surrounding and affected countries. As a 
part of this assistance, the GOJ will extend emergency economic 
assistance to Pakistan and India, who are cooperating with the US 
in this emergency situation. 
VI. The GOJ will provide assistance to displaced persons as 
necessary. This will include the possibility of humanitarian 
assistance by SDF. 
VII. The GOJ, in cooperation with other countries, will take 
appropriate measures in response to the changing situation in order 
to avoid confusion in international and domestic economic 
systems.269 
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The Cabinet Secretariat’s aforementioned response gave priority to the 
dispatch of the SDF. The plan called for the dispatch of logistical support for a possible 
US-led military action, for humanitarian assistance, and for information-gathering 
activities. Even though emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India were 
promised, nowhere in the seven measures nor in the discussions leading up to those 
measures was post-conflict assistance to Afghanistan considered. As noted by one of the 
Prime Minister’s private secretaries, the initial debates within the Kantei (the Prime 
Minister’s official residence) on how to respond to the September 11 incidents mainly 
revolved around two points: providing rescue and relief assistance to the victims in the 
US, and dispatching the SDF and the legal basis of a possible dispatch.270 
In searching for a legal basis for the dispatch, the government officials were 
considering using the law on emergencies surrounding Japan (shuhen jitai hou), using the 
existing UN PKO Law, or creating a new law. The former Defence Agency wanted to use 
the first option; however, the Foreign Ministry required the enactment of a new law on 
the grounds that it would be difficult to regard Afghanistan as an area surrounding Japan. 
In addition, the Ministry considered the dispatch constitutional as long as the SDF’s 
missions were limited to non-combat activities, such as transportation of fuel, water and 
food,271 while some members of the ruling coalition and Defence Agency wanted SDF 
to transform weapons and ammunitions as well. 272  The New Komeito requested a 
number of limitations to the law. These included that the law be a temporary legislation, 
effective for one or two years; be based on a UN resolution; and give importance to UN 
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activities.273 As a result, the ruling coalition managed to reach a consensus on enacting a 
new law that would enable the SDF to give rear-area support to US or any other 
multinational coalition force that would take part in a possible military operation. The 
mission would be restricted to non-combat activities and provision of logistic support. 
Hence, the Cabinet decided to legitimise the law based on UNSC Resolution 1368. 
However, during the drafting process of the law, a number of points remained 
unclear and controversial. The Defence Agency wanted the government to ease the 
restrictions on the use of weapons. Based on the proposed legislation, the SDF was going 
to provide assistance to refugees in Pakistan. The UN Peacekeeping Activities 
Cooperation Law imposed strict restrictions on the use of force by SDF troops. The SDF 
members were only allowed to use weapons for self-defence or for the defence of another 
SDF member. In addition, they were not allowed to use weapons to protect field 
hospitals.274 For this reason, some LDP members wanted to revise the PKO law; however, 
the New Komeito Chief Executives were against that idea. In the final draft, the SDF was 
authorised to use weapons to protect refugees and military personnel from other countries, 
in addition to self-defence. New Komeito wanted the removal of the restrictions as an 
exception only applicable in the scope of the new law.275 The new draft bill also allowed 
the SDF to transport ammunitions and weapons to US forces. On 4 October, the ruling 
coalition came up with draft legislation for three bills: an anti-terrorism bill, a bill to revise 
the SDF Law and a bill to revise the Japan Coast Guard Law. Together with the main 
opposition parties, the establishment of a committee to discuss the bills was decided.  
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The final draft bills were submitted to the Diet on 5 October 2001, as the 
U.S.-led coalition forces launched the airstrikes in Afghanistan. The key points of the 
draft bill were (1) the content of the SDF’s assistance (2) the area of operation (3) the 
conditions under which the SDF personnel could use weapons (4) the creation and 
reporting of the basic plan of SDF’s activities. Under the draft bill, the SDF would provide 
assistance to the United States and its allies in areas of transportation, communication, 
supply of goods, repair and maintenance, medical activities, assistance in airports, harbors 
and bases. A key point in the LDP draft bill was that the supply of weapons and 
ammunitions were not banned. The SDF would be allowed to assist the U.S. forces in 
search and rescue activities and provide relief and rescue activities for refugees. The area 
of operations for SDF were designated as the Indian Ocean— in the vicinity of a U.S. 
base located in the island of Diego Garcia— and Pakistan. The conditions under which 
the SDF was allowed to use weapons were expanded compared to the previously enacted 
International Peace Cooperation Law. Under the UN PKO Law, the SDF had been 
allowed to use weapons for individual protection and the protection of fellow SDF 
members and their equipment. Under the draft bill, SDF could use weapons to protect 
individuals falling under their administration, such as refugees and military personnel of 
other armed forces. Finally, the basic plan of SDF’s activities would be decided by the 
Cabinet and reported to the Diet after the start of operations without delays. 276 
The largest opposition party DPJ requested amendments to the bill in four 
points. First, it demanded that the ruling parties clarify how the use of weapons clause did 
not contravene the constitutional principles against the use of force (Article 9). Second, 
DPJ wanted to ban the transportation of weapons and ammunitions completely. Third, the 
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DPJ insisted on the need for prior Diet approval of the basic plan. Fourth, the DPJ tried 
to reduce the duration of the law to one year.277 The points on which the opposition was 
most persistent were the prior Diet approval and exclusion of the transportation of 
weapons from the activities to be undertaken by the SDF.278 Thus, the DPJ did not oppose 
the dispatch per se, but, was concerned with limiting SDF’s activities to non-military areas 
by disallowing the transportation of weapons and ammunition and imposing strict civilian 
control. The final law, however, did not show major changes in line with the opposition’s 
demands since the coalition government enjoyed a majority in both Houses of the Diet; 
and therefore, did not have to compromise with the opposition. The final law required 
Diet approval within twenty days after the start of SDF’s activities. Also, the law banned 
the transportation of weapons and ammunitions on land into foreign territories and the 
supply of fuel to aircrafts taking off for military activities.279 Nevertheless, the SDF’s 
actual activities did not contain transportation of weapons or ammunitions on land or 
sea.280 
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was extended three times, twice 
of which was during the Koizumi administration in October 2003281 and October 2005.282 
During the discussions of extension at both times the DPJ was against the bill, requesting 
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a clause on prior Diet approval over SDF dispatches283 to ensure civilian control over 
the SDF’s overseas activities. However the opposition parties did not have the majority 
vote in the Diet to reject the bill. 
Besides, logistical support given to the U.S.-led coalition, Japan’s assistance 
for the reconstruction in Afghanistan was initiated during Koizumi administration. The 
idea to invest in Afghanistan’s reconstruction surfaced during the early debates in the Diet 
on how to respond the attacks. In one of his speeches at the Diet, Yukio Hatoyoma, 
member of the largest opposition party DPJ, argued that international efforts to eradicate 
terrorism should not be limited to logistic support, and that Japan could pursue alternative 
paths of diplomacy or strategic use of ODA to cope with the underlying causes of 
terrorism.284 DPJ members continuously emphasised non-military assistance as a way to 
support the eradication of terrorism. It was a DPJ member that first set forth the idea that 
the Japanese Government should provide post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan by 
reviving Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) previous policy on Afghanistan during the 
1990s285  
MOFA’s policy toward the civil war in Afghanistan during the 1990s was 
based on supporting the UN-led efforts on reconciliation between Taliban and non-
Taliban factions in the framework of “Intra-Afghan dialogue.”286 To support those efforts 
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Japan, in 1998, proposed to host a meeting in Tokyo by bringing together various 
conflicting factions. Japan invited the Taliban leaders for a number of times until the 
summer of 2001.287 However, a meeting could not be convened as the Taliban leaders 
did not want to come together with other factions. Besides reconciliation Japan also 
provided economic assistance as a member of the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG). By 
1998, Japan’s financial assistance peaked 400 million US dollars which was channeled 
through UN agencies. Part of that assistance was earmarked for the return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons.288 
The Koizumi administration, however, decided to involve Japan in the 
reconstruction assistance following the requests from the U.S. -side. On October 5, during 
an interview with a Japanese news agency, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage urged Japan to play an active role in the reconstruction in Afghanistan and 
designated education (including women’s education), medical services, and agriculture 
and mine clearance as areas in which Japan could contribute.289  
Following that request, by mid-October Koizumi announced that Japan 
would provide reconstruction assistance for Afghanistan and host an international 
conference in Tokyo for that purpose. On November 9, the government appointed Sadako 
Ogata as the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Afghan Affairs. Ogata and U.S. 
State Secretary of State Colin Powel co-chaired a meeting in Washington (November 20, 
2001) on Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Also, the plan of Japan’s reconstruction assistance 
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was created based on a report by Ogata.290 In the Tokyo Conference held in January 2002, 
Japan pledged 500 million US dollars’ worth of assistance and became one of the co-
chairs of the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group, together with the United States, the 
European Union (EU) and Saudi Arabia.291  
By late April 2002, MOFA declared that Japan would be involved in Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan292 which was not included in Japan’s assistance 
package declared in the Tokyo Conference. In the context of G-8 meeting, a lead donor 
approach was adopted for implementing the SSR programme in Afghanistan. Each 
country would be responsible for the implementation of reform in a certain sector293, the 
Japanese delegation volunteered to become the lead-donor for DDR (Disarmament, 
Demobilizations and Re-integration) of ex-combatants in cooperation with UNAMA 
(United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan). According to the accounts of the 
MOFA officials who were involved in the implementation of DDR projects in 
Afghanistan, the Japanese delegation to the G-8 meetings considered DDR as an 
appropriate area in which Japan could contribute by using its own post-war experiences 
with disarmament and reconstruction.294  
In May 2002, then Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi announced 
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the structure of Japan’s aid to Afghanistan under the banner of “Consolidation of Peace,” 
based on three pillars: support for peace process, domestic security and reconstruction 
and humanitarian assistance.295 Later, in a report submitted by a private commission 
convened by the Koizumi Cabinet, using Japan’s ODA for peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution was advised. 296  Following that, Prime Minister Koizumi announced that 
peacebuilding would become Japan’s new approach to regional conflict resolution 
(Sydney speech). Japan adopted this approach for conflict resolution in Asia. The core of 
this approach is based on diplomacy for meditation between conflicting parties and 
economic assistance for reconstruction. In 2003, in the reformed ODA Charter 
peacebuilding became one of the “priority issues” for Japan’s economic assistance297 and 
thereby institutionalized in Japan’s ODA policy.   
 
3.2.The First Abe Cabinet (September 2006- September 2007) 
One month after Shinzo Abe took office as Prime Minister, the Special 
Measures Law was extended for another year in October 2006.298 However, the Abe 
administration failed to extend the law for the fourth time, and consequently the law 
expired in November 2007. Abe’s failure to extend the law can be attributed to two 
reasons: the result of July 2007 Upper House election which produced a divided 
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legislature and the DPJ’s uncompromising attitude on the extension of the SDF’s mission.  
In January 2007, Abe revealed his intention to create a permanent law for 
SDF’s overseas dispatches in a speech given at the North Atlantic Council and to promote 
greater cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. He also 
mentioned that the Japanese government was considering to make personnel 
contributions to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) which were coalition’s military 
forces in charge of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Abe later changed his view about 
contributing to PRTs which can be attributed to statements from within the LDP that such 
contribution would violate the constitution.  
Establishing a permanent law that would legalize the SDF’s overseas 
dispatch for military operations—in and out of UN framework— had been on the LDP’s 
agenda since, at least, Koizumi administration.299  In May 2007, Abe summoned an 
expert group to study the situations in which Japan could exercise its right of collective 
self-defence. The group designated certain hypothetical cases in which Japan could 
exercise that right.300 
The July 2007 House of Councillors election resulted with LDP’s defeat and 
the DPJ became the largest opposition party in the Upper House, while LDP lost its 
majority position.301 This meant, if the DPJ cooperated with the other opposition parties 
it would have the two-thirds majority required to reject a bill in the Upper House. 
According to the constitution of Japan, a bill must be approved in both Houses of the Diet, 
but Article 59 stipulates that a bill rejected or not voted on at the House of Councillors 
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can still be turned into a law within sixty days, if it is approved for a second time in the 
House of Representatives by at least two-thirds of the members present. 302  Thus, 
ultimately, the Upper House cannot prevent the bill being turned into a law if the Lower 
House manages to pass the bill with a second vote. Nevertheless, that “sixty days” gave 
enough time for the opposition to engage in delaying tactics. The Abe administration, 
initially, did not immediately push the bill through the Diet with a second voting at the 
Lower House and sought to negotiate with the DPJ.  
The DPJ Secretary-General Ozawa was not exactly responsive to Abe’s 
approach. Following DPJ’s victory in the elections, he mentioned that the DPJ, would not 
change its stance of opposing the extension of the refuelling mission.303 Ozawa also 
declined Abe’s requests for a meeting outside of the Diet. Even pressure applied by 
various U.S. state department officials did not work. By early August, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer requested a meeting with Ozawa to convince him 
to support the extension of the bill, but Ozawa declined. 304  This was followed by 
President Bush’s statement at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit 
meeting in which he requested Japan to continue its support to the war on terror.305 As a 
response, Prime Minister Abe promised that he would resign if he could not extend the 
Law. Moreover, on September 5, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution 
expressing U.S. gratitude for Japan’s support for the war on terror.306 Despite all these 
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pressures, Ozawa did not change his opinion.  
By September 10, Prime Minister Abe declared that instead of extending the 
ATSML he would create a new bill which would incorporate DPJ members’ views.307 
However, DPJ strictly opposed the extension of the refuelling mission and was planning 
to submit a censure motion against Abe in the Upper House and pressure him for 
resignation.308 The intention was to exceed the sixty days limit for a second voting. By 
late September, Abe resigned mentioning Ozawa’s uncompromising attitude and his 
administration’s failure to extend the bill as one of the reasons behind his resignation,309 
even if Abe’s illness was widely acknowledged as the main reason behind his resignation. 
Ozawa opposed the extension, on the ground that the SDF cooperated with 
the U.S.-led OEF which was not a UN -commanded mission. The coalition’s activities 
were based on the U.S. right for self-defence.310 Ozawa once mentioned that SDF should 
participate in the NATO-led but UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF).311 However, Ozawa’s view on ISAF participation did not reflect the party’s 
general stance as evidenced by the content of the counter-bill proposed to the Diet by DPJ 
in December 2007 which opposed participation in ISAF. Thus, we can say that Ozawa’s 
individual preferences did not determine the general stance of the DPJ.  
3.3.The Fukuda Cabinet (September 2007- August 2008) 
The Fukuda administration succeeding Abe had two options in order to make 
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the extension of the SDF’s mission possible— to push Abe’s bill in the Lower House; 
propose a new temporary bill or create a permanent law for the overseas deployment of 
the SDF. 
The Fukuda cabinet did not follow Abe’s more assertive path of creating a 
permanent law and proceeded with the second option. A new draft bill was submitted to 
the Diet on October 17, 2007. The new draft bill restricted the SDF’s mission to only 
supplying fuel and water to the coalition vessels. The bill also excluded the clause on ex 
post facto Diet approval required in the ATSML. Under the new draft bill, the government 
was only obliged to report the MSDF activities to the Diet every year312 instead of 
seeking an approval in the Diet. Thus, SDF’s assistance was limited to support the U.S.-
led coalition. Under pressure from the New Komeitō, LDP’s junior coalition partner, the 
LDP leaders decided to draft a temporary law effective for one year.313  
The government initially, sought to compromise with the opposition as Abe 
did; however, as before, the DPJ continued their delaying tactics. This time the DPJ had 
acquired a strong leverage for that purpose. News that the fuel provided by the MSDF 
was diverted to U.S.-led operations in Iraq was revealed by a Japanese non-profit 
organization Peace Depot. 314  In connection to this, the government officials were 
accused of altering the records about the quantity of fuel transported by the MSDF.315 
The situation was worsened with corruption allegations targeting the Defence Ministry. 
The DPJ refused to start discussions before investigating those allegations,316 which 
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prolonged the discussions on the government sponsored bill. Consequently by late 
October it became clear that passing the new bill would not be possible before November 
and the MSDF’s mission would be suspended for a while.  
The new DPJ leader, Yukio Hatoyama echoed Ozawa’s view by suggesting 
that the U.S. war was not clearly sanctioned by a UN resolution.317 Another reason for 
Hatoyama to oppose the new draft bill was that it further diluted civilian control over SDF 
activities. The DPJ submitted its counter-proposal to the Upper House in late December. 
DPJ’s draft bill posited that the priority in Japan’s efforts for eradication of terrorism 
should be supporting the reconciliation process between the Afghanistan government and 
anti-government Taliban forces. The DPJ proposal declared, after a ceasefire agreement 
was concluded between the warring parties, the SDF would be dispatched for providing 
post-conflict humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The bill also stated that the SDF 
would not participate in ISAF.318 The DPJ President Ozawa mentioned that instead of 
providing logistical support for a military operation, Japan should provide “public welfare 
assistance to the people of Afghanistan.” 319  The DPJ proposal also included the 
establishment of a human security centre in Afghanistan.320  
The government sponsored bill passed the House of Representatives on 13 
November 2007 but it was voted down in the Upper House. Instead, the DPJ sponsored 
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bill was approved by the Upper House on 11 January 2008. 321  The same day, the 
government sponsored bill was passed by acquiring two thirds majority in a second voting 
at the Lower House, and became a law. The LDP controlled Lower House did not vote on 
the DPJ sponsored bill.322 The MSDF’s mission was relaunched the next month. In 2009, 
during the tenure of Prime Minister Aso, the law was extended for another year, in a 
similar vein with a second voting at the House of Representatives.  
 
3.4.The Hatoyama Cabinet (September 2009-June 2010)  
DPJ’s success in the 2009 Lower House election had given the party an 
opportunity to realize its policy proposals for the conflict in Afghanistan.323 Even though 
terminating the refueling mission was not explicitly stated in DPJ’s election manifesto324, 
during the election campaign, Hatoyama publicly stated that, if elected, his future 
government would discontinue the mission. 325  It was mentioned, however, in the 
manifesto that the DPJ would pursue a peacebuilding approach for the eradication of 
terrorism and economic assistance for poverty reduction, state-building, police and 
administrative reform, strengthening governance institutions, and providing humanitarian 
and reconstruction assistance. 326 
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He repeatedly emphasized, before and after the election, that his government 
would prioritize “civilian assistance” for the eradication of terrorism in Afghanistan.327 
Consequently, the SDF’s mission was brought to an end in January 2010, in spite of the 
Obama Administration’s request to continue the mission and the higher costs involved 
with additional economic assistance. The extended reconstruction assistance was worth 5 
billion U.S. dollars (about 450 billion yen), which was to be implemented in the following 
five years.328 The amount was not only four times the total aid provided since 2002329 
but also seven times of the cost of the fuel supplied to coalition vessels since 2001.330 
The DPJ had been working on a new policy for Afghanistan’s reconstruction 
since December 2007, under the initiative of Tadashi Inuzuka, a DPJ politician and a 
member of the House of Councillors at that time. He cooperated with Kenji Isezaki— 
who was the MOFA appointed official in charge of planning the first DDR programme in 
Afghanistan— to initiate a new policy of reconstruction assistance. After, visiting 
Afghanistan and various countries involved in the state building process, they came up 
with the proposal to focus Japan’s assistance on reconciliation with the former Taliban 
combatants and their re-integration into the Afghan society.331 Based on that proposal, 
the DPJ-led government announced the content of their assistance package by early 
November 2009. Japan’s assistance would be based on three pillars: improvement of the 
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security sector, facilitating the reconciliation between government and anti-government 
forces, and civilian assistance for sustainable and independent development of 
Afghanistan in areas such as rural development, agriculture and job-training of ex-Taliban 
combatants.332  
 
4. Conclusion  
The September 11 incidents gave the Japanese government an opportunity to 
decide whether or not to send troops in support of the US-led military force fighting 
against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaida network in Afghanistan. The Koizumi Cabinet 
was able to pass a law that authorized troop dispatches by receiving the approval of its 
pacifist coalition partner, the New Kōmeitō which had been against troop dispatches to 
military operations outside of a UN framework. Two factors helped the government to 
secure Komeito’s support. First was the side payment in the form of offering a minister 
post. The second one was a normative concession in the sense that the LDP agreed on the 
imposition of limitations to the draft bill. As the Koizumi Cabinet was a coalition 
government which enjoyed majority in both Houses of the Diet, the draft bill was easily 
passed despite the rejection of the opposition parties. This was the same during the Abe 
administration until the July 2007 Upper House elections in which the LDP coalition lost 
its majority status to the DPJ-led opposition parties. This gave the opposition an upper 
hand in the Upper House and enabled them to exploit procedural rules for delaying the 
discussion of the bill. While both Abe and Fukuda administrations’ offered to compromise 
with the DPJ—even Fukuda offered Ichiro Ozawa and his group to join his party— 
Ozawa rejected and went on to criticize the government for supporting a US war and 
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going against Japan’s Constitutional principles. The DPJ also came up with alternative 
policy plan in Afghanistan based on non-military and public welfare assistance for the 
civilians in Afghanistan. While Ozawa’s uncompromising attitude can be attributed to his 
own personal interests as the chances for Ozawa and the DPJ to win the Upper House 
elections and replace the LDP were high and perhaps Ozawa chose to be a part of the 
winning side. However, the general party stance of the DPJ had been consistent since the 
2001 which prioritized non-military civilian assistance.  
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Conclusion 
This study examined how it was possible for the ruling political elite in Japan 
to convince the opposition parties to approve the expansion of the SDF’s roles in the 
context of international military operations. In the previous literature on Japan’s overseas 
troop deployments this question has been largely ignored. The study covered legislative 
processes behind two laws. The UN PKO law and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures 
Law and attempted to shed light on the strategies adopted by the ruling party to change 
the policy preferences of the opposition parties. This research attempted to clarify this 
question by tracing the intra-party interaction during the enactment of the above-
mentioned laws.  
In order to answer these questions, the study referred to two existing hypotheses, 
based on the constructivist and rational choice approaches, on how domestic actors’ 
change their foreign policy preferences. Constructivist approach suggests that actors 
policy preferences are shaped by conceptions of state identity— the political elite’s and 
wider society’s beliefs about their states role in the international society. In domestic 
settings where identity conceptions are widely contested, actors’ compete to influence the 
policy making process. This view also suggests that actors may also try to persuade one 
another to change their preferences by using the power of new ideas learned from the 
international context. As such, the study tried to address the question of whether such 
changes in policy preferences were induced by normative factors or material incentives 
by using the case of Japan’s policy on overseas troop deployments.  
The detailed findings of the research are in the following way. In the first case, 
the government sponsored UN PKO Law was based on the idea of internationalism and 
making a contribution in accordance with Japan’s state identity as a major economic 
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power. The two opposition parties which cooperated with the LDP in drafting the bill 
accepted these ideas and had the opportunity to shape the content of the bill in accordance 
with their normative preferences. Nevertheless, when the discussions between the two 
opposition parties reached a stalemate, Prime Minister Miyazawa and other LDP 
executives offered a number of side-payments. These included threats to hold 
simultaneous elections which would adversely affect the presence of the smaller parties 
in the Diet, promises to initiate political reform on addressing corruption in political fund-
raising, electoral reform and cuts in the defense budget. These threats, promises and 
concessions, in other words “side-payments” expedited the enactment of the law. Thus, 
both normative and material concessions were made by the ruling LDP for winning the 
support of the opposition parties. 
The September 11 terrorist attacks brought another opportunity for Japanese 
government to make a decision— whether or not to make troop contributions to the 
military coalition that was formed to eradicate the Al-Qaida and Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan. Thus, the second case involves the SDF’s deployment to support the US-led 
“war on terror” in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. Under the laws that authorized 
the deployment, the SDF’s main mission was to provide logistical support to United States 
and allied forces. As the ruling LDP- Komeito and Conservative Party coalition held a 
majority in both Houses of the Diet (in the Lower House a two-thirds majority and in the 
Upper House they held a simple majority), the LDP did not have to adjust its policies in 
accordance with the opposition parties’ .demands. The Conservative Party had similar 
policy preferences to that of the LDP; however, winning the approval of Komeito 
mattered as the LDP depended on Komeito’s votes in the Diet.  
Komeito’s support was won by then Prime Minister Koizumi through material 
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and normative concessions during the coalition formation process which preceded the 
outbreak of the September 11 incidents. First, SDF’s roles were limited to non-military 
logistical support and second, as part of the coalition deal between the Komeito and LDP, 
Komeito attained the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.  
The successive Koizumi Cabinets succeeded in continuing the SDF’s mission 
until July 2007 Upper House election which resulted in the DPJ’s victory. The opposition 
block led by the DPJ held a majority in the Upper House. In order to extend the SDF’s 
mission in 2007 and 2008, the Abe and Fukuda Cabinets, tried to negotiate with the DPJ 
leaders. The LDP executives offered a series of material concessions to DPJ leaders. The 
DPJ leaders refused to compromise as the prospects of wining the upcoming House of 
Representative election (2010) was higher for DPJ than it was for the LDP. As a result of 
DPJ leaders’ uncompromising attitude, the SDF’s mission was suspended briefly. 
However, as the ruling coalition held a two-thirds majority in the Lower House, they 
passed another law with a similar content in a second voting in the Lower House. When 
the DPJ-led government came into power in 2009, the SDF’s mission was terminated. 
In conclusion, in each case I found that opposition parties changed their 
positions on overseas troop deployments after an opportunity to enhance their political 
power or survival arose. If the material incentives provided by the LDP to the opposition 
or coalition parties had the potential to enhance the parties’ political power, then these 
parties made adjustments to their policy preferences. However, when the material 
incentives offered by the ruling party to the opposition did not have the potential to 
maximize the opposition’s political power then opposition parties stuck to their original 
policy preferences. Consequently, actors made adjustments to their policy preferences as 
a result of material incentives.  
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For future research, two issues could be further investigated. First, the case of 
Iraq— namely, the enactment process of the Law Concerning the Special Measures on 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (July 2003)— and the creation of the 
International Peace Support Law need to be examined. Second, the question of why the 
Komeito, a traditionally pacifist political party consented to the expansion of the external 
military roles of the SDF could be further investigated.  
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Figure 1. Coalition Decision Model 
(Source: Joe D. Hagan, Philip Everts, Haruhiro Fukui, and John Stempel, “Foreign 
Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise and Anarchy,” International Studies Review 
3, no.2 (2001): 178.) 
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